bleedingdeacons / monitor / 32754223488
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feat: an optional fingerprint to open, and a Close that does not stop alerts (#19)

* feat: an optional fingerprint to open, and a Close that does not stop alerts

A duty handset spends its life signed in, unattended and full of other
people's worst days, so this adds a lock a responder may turn on: a
fingerprint between launching Hand and seeing the duty screen. Off until
they choose it, and off entirely on a head that cannot ask.

It is not authentication and does not pretend to be. Reach decided whose
handset this is at sign-in and the device token still proves it on every
request; IAppLock answers the smaller domestic question of whether the
person holding the phone is the responder it was handed to. So the
preference lives in Preferences rather than secure storage, and no
secret hangs off the prompt's result — which is also why the Android
half accepts the weak biometric class rather than excluding ordinary
handsets whose reader Google grades as convenience.

Nothing about it may keep a responder from an alert, and three rules
enforce that. It is asked on a cold start only, never on resume. It is
skipped outright when anything is already outstanding, because an alert
waiting at launch means the app is being opened precisely because it
rang. And the alert loop starts before the gate, so polling, push and
the alarm all run behind the lock and LockViewModel steps aside the
moment something lands. An unavailable sensor opens the app rather than
closing it: failing shut would take a certified responder off the rota
over a hardware fault nobody can fix at midnight. The lock screen's
quiet sign-out is the way out of a finger that will not take, and costs
nothing but the enrolment, since signing back in goes through Reach.

Android uses AndroidX BiometricPrompt; the Apple heads use
LocalAuthentication, and both Info.plists gain NSFaceIDUsageDescription,
without which a Face ID device terminates the app rather than refusing
it. Windows reports that it can... (continued)

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