hyperscale-stack / security / 39651086061

99%

master: 98%

Build Type

Pull #127

github

Committed by euskadi31

Commit Message

fix(jwt): close the code-review findings of the audit fixes

- The active-token check kept its error's chain under ErrTokenInactive:
  an error wrapping security.ErrInvalidRequest made the transports answer
  400 invalid_request instead of the documented 401 invalid_token. Only the
  error's text is kept now, in both the inactive and the unavailable
  mapping.
- The check received the verified claims themselves, read afterwards for
  the principal, the name and the authorities: a check rewriting them
  changed the authenticated identity. It receives a deep copy, and its
  godoc says it is called concurrently.
- An Ed25519 private key whose public half is not the one its seed derives
  (the all-zero buffer, whose half is a small-order point; spliced keys)
  passed PrivateKey.Validate and NewSigner and signed tokens no key
  verifies (RFC 8032 §5.1.5). It is refused with ErrInvalidKey.
- The opaque PS* self-check now says the signature does not verify under
  the signer's public key with a hash-size salt, which also covers a
  public key that is not the signer's.
- Tests pin that an oversized JOSE header is refused before it is
  base64-decoded, and that a token-family revocation reaches the
  active-token check through the store recipe.
- Docs: PublicKey.Validate checks a canonical y-coordinate (an off-curve
  one verifies nothing); the MIGRATION recipe uses a checked type
  assertion; tokens without client_id never report SubjectIsClient.

Audit: D-03, F-08, I-11, I-12, I-13.

Pull Request Pull Request #127: fix(jwt)!: close the jwt findings of the 2026-10-21 security audit

Coverage Stats

135 of 135 new or added lines in 9 files covered. (100.0%)

1 existing line in 1 file now uncovered.

14009 of 14222 relevant lines covered (98.5%)

5363.63 hits per line