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chideat / valkey-operator / 34821160671
36%

Build:
DEFAULT BRANCH: main
Ran 14 Sep 2026 08:11AM UTC
Jobs 1
Files 147
Run time 1min
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14 Sep 2026 08:08AM UTC coverage: 26.536% (+0.09%) from 26.442%
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fix: close the 16 open CodeQL high alerts, one of them a real MITM (#125)

* fix(security): verify the peer certificate instead of accepting any

Every TLS connection the operator and the helper made accepted whatever
certificate the peer presented.

Five of the six sites built a RootCAs pool from the instance CA and then set
InsecureSkipVerify, which makes the pool dead weight. The sixth, in the helper,
had no CA at all. Anything able to answer on the pod network -- a hostile pod,
a redirected Service -- could terminate these connections with a self-signed
certificate and the operator would authenticate to it and hand over the ACL
credentials it carries.

InsecureSkipVerify was not gratuitous: the operator dials nodes by pod IP, the
issued certificates carry DNS SANs only, and the three architectures issue
different name sets, so no name the caller can compute is reliably present.
Verification against the dial address can therefore never succeed.

The certificate held in the secret is the one the nodes serve, so ServerName is
taken from the certificate itself. The name check is then satisfiable and the
chain is validated against the instance CA. Name verification proves nothing
here anyway, since every node of an instance shares one certificate -- the
security is in the chain check this restores.

The three inline copies of this config now call the helper that already
existed, and the helper binary reads --tls-ca-file, a flag that was already
defined in all five command packages and simply never used.

Threat model: this assumes the pod network is not trusted. If the intent were
to trust it, TLS would not be configured at all.

The test mints a CA and a leaf, then performs real handshakes over a loopback
connection dialled by address rather than by name, mirroring how the operator
connects. Against the previous code it reports "handshake succeeded against a
certificate this CA never issued" -- the vulnerability itself, not a lint.

Fixes 5 CodeQL go/... (continued)

43 of 115 new or added lines in 9 files covered. (37.39%)

4 existing lines in 2 files now uncovered.

5516 of 20787 relevant lines covered (26.54%)

0.3 hits per line

Uncovered Changes

Lines Coverage ∆ File
42
38.89
-61.11% internal/util/auth.go
12
0.0
0.0% cmd/helper/commands/helper.go
5
0.0
0.0% internal/valkey/node.go
5
0.0
0.0% internal/valkey/sentinel/node.go
3
0.0
0.0% internal/valkey/cluster/cluster.go
3
0.0
0.0% internal/valkey/sentinel/sentinel.go
2
81.36
2.51% api/core/helper/helper.go

Coverage Regressions

Lines Coverage ∆ File
2
74.19
-1.61% cmd/helper/sync/file.go
2
38.89
-61.11% internal/util/auth.go
Jobs
ID Job ID Ran Files Coverage
1 34821160671.1 14 Sep 2026 08:11AM UTC 147
26.54
GitHub Action Run
Source Files on build 34821160671
  • Tree
  • List 147
  • Changed 9
  • Source Changed 0
  • Coverage Changed 9
Coverage ∆ File Lines Relevant Covered Missed Hits/Line
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