cryptosphere / rbnacl

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LAST BUILD ON BRANCH remove-anti-nist-fud

branch: remove-anti-nist-fud

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Build # 457

Build Type

push

travis-ci

Committed by tarcieri

Commit Message

Remove anti-NIST FUD

I'm no fan of NIST, at least when it comes to the specification of cryptographic
standards. They have been the NSA's stooge since the 1987 Computer Security Act
theoretically gave them, and not the NSA, control of these standards. They
subsequently went on to push the (inferior) Digital Signature Algorithm over RSA
signatures, most likely because the NSA was worried about having a standard for
public key encryption which they were incapable of breaking. Rinse, repeat with
Dual_EC_DRBG, a standard intentionally backdoored by the NSA.

This has happened before, and it will all happen again.

That said, perhaps this README isn't the best venue for voicing these concerns.

Run Details

1062 of 1079 relevant lines covered (98.42%)

28.04 hits per line