25139258422

Committed 29 Apr 2026 08:02PM UTC coverage: 89.37% (-0.02%) from 89.385%

Build # 25139258422

Build Type

push

github

Committed by

web-flow

Commit Message

Merge pull request #5550 from randombit/jack/tls-misc

TLS conformance, hardening, and performance fixes

Coverage Stats

107055 of 119789 relevant lines covered (89.37%)

11415549.66 hits per line

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

91.35

/src/lib/tls/tls12/msg_server_kex.cpp

/*
* Server Key Exchange Message
* (C) 2004-2010,2012,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd
*     2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/

#include <botan/tls_messages_12.h>

#include <botan/bigint.h>
#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
#include <botan/dl_group.h>
#include <botan/tls_callbacks.h>
#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
#include <botan/internal/loadstor.h>
#include <botan/internal/target_info.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>

#include <botan/dh.h>

namespace Botan::TLS {

Server_Key_Exchange::~Server_Key_Exchange() = default;

/**
* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
*/
Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,
                                         Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
                                         const Private_Key* signing_key) {
   const std::string hostname = state.client_hello()->sni_hostname();
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      const std::string identity_hint = creds.psk_identity_hint("tls-server", hostname);

      append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);
   }

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
      const std::vector<Group_Params> dh_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_dh_groups();

      m_shared_group = Group_Params::NONE;

      /*
      RFC 7919 requires that if the client sends any groups in the FFDHE
      range, that we must select one of these. If this is not possible,
      then we are required to reject the connection.

      If the client did not send any DH groups, but did offer DH ciphersuites
      and we selected one, then consult the policy for which DH group to pick.
      */

      if(dh_groups.empty()) {
         m_shared_group = policy.default_dh_group();
      } else {
         m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(dh_groups, {});
      }

      if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Could not agree on a DH group with the client");
      }

      // The policy had better return a group we know about:
      BOTAN_ASSERT(m_shared_group.value().is_dh_named_group(), "DH ciphersuite is using a known finite field group");

      // Note: TLS 1.2 allows defining and using arbitrary DH groups (additional
      //       to the named and standardized ones). This API doesn't allow the
      //       server to make use of that at the moment. TLS 1.3 does not
      //       provide this flexibility!
      //
      // A possible implementation strategy in case one would ever need that:
      // `Policy::default_dh_group()` could return a `std::variant<Group_Params,
      // DL_Group>`, allowing it to define arbitrary groups.
      m_kex_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(m_shared_group.value(), rng);
      auto* dh = dynamic_cast<DH_PrivateKey*>(m_kex_key.get());
      if(dh == nullptr) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a Diffie-Hellman key");
      }

      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("p").serialize(), 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("g").serialize(), 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->public_value(), 2);
   } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      const std::vector<Group_Params> ec_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_ecc_curves();

      if(ec_groups.empty()) {
         throw Internal_Error("Client sent no ECC extension but we negotiated ECDH");
      }

      m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(ec_groups, {});

      if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "No shared ECC group with client");
      }

      m_kex_key = [&] {
         if(m_shared_group->is_ecdh_named_curve()) {
            const auto pubkey_point_format = state.client_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()
                                                ? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
                                                : EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;
            return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(*m_shared_group, rng, pubkey_point_format);
         } else {
            return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(*m_shared_group, rng);
         }
      }();

      if(!m_kex_key) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");
      }

      const uint16_t named_curve_id = m_shared_group.value().wire_code();
      m_params.push_back(3);  // named curve
      m_params.push_back(get_byte<0>(named_curve_id));
      m_params.push_back(get_byte<1>(named_curve_id));

      // Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
      // point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
      // in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, m_kex_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);
   } else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));
   }

   if(state.ciphersuite().signature_used()) {
      BOTAN_ASSERT(signing_key, "Signing key was set");

      const std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
         state.choose_sig_format(*signing_key, m_scheme, false, policy);

      std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();

      buf += state.server_hello()->random();
      buf += params();

      m_signature = state.callbacks().tls_sign_message(*signing_key, rng, format.first, format.second, buf);
   }

   state.hash().update(io.send(*this));
}

/**
* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
*/
Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& buf,
                                         const Kex_Algo kex_algo,
                                         const Auth_Method auth_method,
                                         Protocol_Version version) {
   BOTAN_UNUSED(version);  // remove this
   TLS_Data_Reader reader("ServerKeyExchange", buf);

   /*
   * Here we are deserializing enough to find out what offset the
   * signature is at. All processing is done when the Client Key Exchange
   * is prepared.
   */

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);  // identity hint
   }

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
      // 3 bigints, DH p, g, Y

      for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i) {
         reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);
      }
   } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      reader.get_byte();                     // curve type
      reader.get_uint16_t();                 // curve id
      reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);  // public key
   } else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unsupported kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));
   }

   m_params.assign(buf.data(), buf.data() + reader.read_so_far());

   if(auth_method != Auth_Method::IMPLICIT) {
      m_scheme = Signature_Scheme(reader.get_uint16_t());
      // RFC 5246 4.7: digitally-signed signatures are opaque<1..2^16-1>.
      // Matches the parallel check in Certificate_Verify.
      m_signature = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);
   }

   reader.assert_done();
}

/**
* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
*/
std::vector<uint8_t> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const {
   std::vector<uint8_t> buf = params();

   if(!m_signature.empty()) {
      if(m_scheme.is_set()) {
         buf.push_back(get_byte<0>(m_scheme.wire_code()));
         buf.push_back(get_byte<1>(m_scheme.wire_code()));
      }

      append_tls_length_value(buf, m_signature, 2);
   }

   return buf;
}

/**
* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
*/
bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const Public_Key& server_key,
                                 const Handshake_State& state,
                                 const Policy& policy) const {
   policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(server_key);

   const std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
      state.parse_sig_format(server_key, m_scheme, state.client_hello()->signature_schemes(), false, policy);

   std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();

   buf += state.server_hello()->random();
   buf += params();

   const bool signature_valid =
      state.callbacks().tls_verify_message(server_key, format.first, format.second, buf, m_signature);

#if defined(BOTAN_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
   BOTAN_UNUSED(signature_valid);
   return true;
#else
   return signature_valid;
#endif
}

const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& Server_Key_Exchange::server_kex_key() const {
   BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(m_kex_key);
   return *m_kex_key;
}

}  // namespace Botan::TLS

1	/*
2	* Server Key Exchange Message
3	* (C) 2004-2010,2012,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd
4	* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
5	*
6	* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
7	*/
8
9	#include <botan/tls_messages_12.h>
10
11	#include <botan/bigint.h>
12	#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
13	#include <botan/dl_group.h>
14	#include <botan/tls_callbacks.h>
15	#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
16	#include <botan/internal/loadstor.h>
17	#include <botan/internal/target_info.h>
18	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
19	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
20	#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
21
22	#include <botan/dh.h>
23
24	namespace Botan::TLS {
25
26	Server_Key_Exchange::~Server_Key_Exchange() = default;	6,679✔
27
28	/**
29	* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
30	*/
31	Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,	695✔
32	Handshake_State& state,
33	const Policy& policy,
34	Credentials_Manager& creds,
35	RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
36	const Private_Key* signing_key) {	695✔
37	const std::string hostname = state.client_hello()->sni_hostname();	695✔
38	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	695✔
39
40	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	695✔
41	const std::string identity_hint = creds.psk_identity_hint("tls-server", hostname);	49✔
42
43	append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);	98✔
44	}	49✔
45
46	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	695✔
47	const std::vector<Group_Params> dh_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_dh_groups();	7✔
48
49	m_shared_group = Group_Params::NONE;	7✔
50
51	/*
52	RFC 7919 requires that if the client sends any groups in the FFDHE
53	range, that we must select one of these. If this is not possible,
54	then we are required to reject the connection.
55
56	If the client did not send any DH groups, but did offer DH ciphersuites
57	and we selected one, then consult the policy for which DH group to pick.
58	*/
59
60	if(dh_groups.empty()) {	7✔
61	m_shared_group = policy.default_dh_group();	×
62	} else {
63	m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(dh_groups, {});	14✔
64	}
65
66	if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {	7✔
67	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Could not agree on a DH group with the client");	×
68	}
69
70	// The policy had better return a group we know about:
71	BOTAN_ASSERT(m_shared_group.value().is_dh_named_group(), "DH ciphersuite is using a known finite field group");	7✔
72
73	// Note: TLS 1.2 allows defining and using arbitrary DH groups (additional
74	// to the named and standardized ones). This API doesn't allow the
75	// server to make use of that at the moment. TLS 1.3 does not
76	// provide this flexibility!
77	//
78	// A possible implementation strategy in case one would ever need that:
79	// `Policy::default_dh_group()` could return a `std::variant<Group_Params,
80	// DL_Group>`, allowing it to define arbitrary groups.
81	m_kex_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(m_shared_group.value(), rng);	7✔
82	auto* dh = dynamic_cast<DH_PrivateKey*>(m_kex_key.get());	7✔
83	if(dh == nullptr) {	7✔
84	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a Diffie-Hellman key");	×
85	}
86
87	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("p").serialize(), 2);	21✔
88	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("g").serialize(), 2);	21✔
89	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->public_value(), 2);	21✔
90	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	695✔
91	const std::vector<Group_Params> ec_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_ecc_curves();	651✔
92
93	if(ec_groups.empty()) {	651✔
94	throw Internal_Error("Client sent no ECC extension but we negotiated ECDH");	×
95	}
96
97	m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(ec_groups, {});	1,302✔
98
99	if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {	651✔
100	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "No shared ECC group with client");	×
101	}
102
103	m_kex_key = [&] {	1,953✔
104	if(m_shared_group->is_ecdh_named_curve()) {	651✔
105	const auto pubkey_point_format = state.client_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()	27✔
106	? EC_Point_Format::Compressed	27✔
107	: EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;	27✔
108	return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(*m_shared_group, rng, pubkey_point_format);	27✔
109	} else {
110	return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(*m_shared_group, rng);	1,248✔
111	}
112	}();	651✔
113
114	if(!m_kex_key) {	651✔
115	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");	×
116	}
117
118	const uint16_t named_curve_id = m_shared_group.value().wire_code();	651✔
119	m_params.push_back(3); // named curve	651✔
120	m_params.push_back(get_byte<0>(named_curve_id));	651✔
121	m_params.push_back(get_byte<1>(named_curve_id));	651✔
122
123	// Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
124	// point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
125	// in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
126	append_tls_length_value(m_params, m_kex_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);	1,953✔
127	} else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {	688✔
128	throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));	×
129	}
130
131	if(state.ciphersuite().signature_used()) {	695✔
132	BOTAN_ASSERT(signing_key, "Signing key was set");	646✔
133
134	const std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =	646✔
135	state.choose_sig_format(*signing_key, m_scheme, false, policy);	646✔
136
137	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();	646✔
138
139	buf += state.server_hello()->random();	646✔
140	buf += params();	646✔
141
142	m_signature = state.callbacks().tls_sign_message(*signing_key, rng, format.first, format.second, buf);	646✔
143	}	646✔
144
145	state.hash().update(io.send(*this));	2,083✔
146	}	697✔
147
148	/**
149	* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
150	*/
151	Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& buf,	1,030✔
152	const Kex_Algo kex_algo,
153	const Auth_Method auth_method,
154	Protocol_Version version) {	1,030✔
155	BOTAN_UNUSED(version); // remove this	1,030✔
156	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ServerKeyExchange", buf);	1,030✔
157
158	/*
159	* Here we are deserializing enough to find out what offset the
160	* signature is at. All processing is done when the Client Key Exchange
161	* is prepared.
162	*/
163
164	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	1,030✔
165	reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535); // identity hint	112✔
166	}
167
168	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	1,030✔
169	// 3 bigints, DH p, g, Y
170
171	for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i) {	87✔
172	reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	131✔
173	}
174	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	1,005✔
175	reader.get_byte(); // curve type	975✔
176	reader.get_uint16_t(); // curve id	974✔
177	reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255); // public key	1,945✔
178	} else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {	30✔
179	throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unsupported kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));	×
180	}
181
182	m_params.assign(buf.data(), buf.data() + reader.read_so_far());	1,020✔
183
184	if(auth_method != Auth_Method::IMPLICIT) {	1,020✔
185	m_scheme = Signature_Scheme(reader.get_uint16_t());	964✔
186	// RFC 5246 4.7: digitally-signed signatures are opaque<1..2^16-1>.
187	// Matches the parallel check in Certificate_Verify.
188	m_signature = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	961✔
189	}
190
191	reader.assert_done();	1,012✔
192	}	1,046✔
193
194	/**
195	* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
196	*/
197	std::vector<uint8_t> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const {	695✔
198	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = params();	695✔
199
200	if(!m_signature.empty()) {	695✔
201	if(m_scheme.is_set()) {	646✔
202	buf.push_back(get_byte<0>(m_scheme.wire_code()));	646✔
203	buf.push_back(get_byte<1>(m_scheme.wire_code()));	646✔
204	}
205
206	append_tls_length_value(buf, m_signature, 2);	646✔
207	}
208
209	return buf;	695✔
210	}	×
211
212	/**
213	* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
214	*/
215	bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const Public_Key& server_key,	952✔
216	const Handshake_State& state,
217	const Policy& policy) const {
218	policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(server_key);	952✔
219
220	const std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =	908✔
221	state.parse_sig_format(server_key, m_scheme, state.client_hello()->signature_schemes(), false, policy);	908✔
222
223	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();	899✔
224
225	buf += state.server_hello()->random();	899✔
226	buf += params();	899✔
227
228	const bool signature_valid =	899✔
229	state.callbacks().tls_verify_message(server_key, format.first, format.second, buf, m_signature);	899✔
230
231	#if defined(BOTAN_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
232	BOTAN_UNUSED(signature_valid);
233	return true;
234	#else
235	return signature_valid;	899✔
236	#endif
237	}	899✔
238
239	const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& Server_Key_Exchange::server_kex_key() const {	643✔
240	BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(m_kex_key);	643✔
241	return *m_kex_key;	643✔
242	}
243
244	} // namespace Botan::TLS

randombit / botan / 25139258422

Source File Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous