23624534405

Committed 26 Mar 2026 07:08PM UTC coverage: 72.113% (-0.2%) from 72.361%

Build # 23624534405

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github

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web-flow

Commit Message

Make imds networking unlocked by default (#41359)

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41.86

/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */

#include <getopt.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include "sd-device.h"
#include "sd-event.h"
#include "sd-json.h"
#include "sd-messages.h"

#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "argv-util.h"
#include "ask-password-api.h"
#include "build.h"
#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
#include "efi-api.h"
#include "efi-loader.h"
#include "efivars.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "extract-word.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "json-util.h"
#include "libfido2-util.h"
#include "libmount-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "main-func.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "pkcs11-util.h"
#include "pretty-print.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#include "tpm2-pcr.h"
#include "tpm2-util.h"
#include "verbs.h"

/* internal helper */
#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */
#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U
#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U

typedef enum PassphraseType {
        PASSPHRASE_NONE,
        PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0,
        PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1,
        PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY,
        _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX,
        _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1,
} PassphraseType;

typedef enum TokenType {
        TOKEN_TPM2,
        TOKEN_FIDO2,
        TOKEN_PKCS11,
        _TOKEN_TYPE_MAX,
        _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} TokenType;

static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */
static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
static unsigned arg_key_size = 0;
static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE;
static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0;
static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0;
static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false;
static bool arg_try_empty_password = false;
static char *arg_hash = NULL;
static char *arg_header = NULL;
static unsigned arg_tries = 3;
static bool arg_readonly = false;
static bool arg_verify = false;
static bool arg_password_cache_set = false; /* Not the actual argument value, just an indicator that some value is set */
static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE;
static bool arg_discards = false;
static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false;
static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false;
static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false;
static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
static uint32_t arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim = 0;
static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL;
static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL;
static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0;
static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL;
/* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do
 * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we
 * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. */
static Fido2EnrollFlags arg_fido2_manual_flags = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; /* These and the following fields are about locking an encrypted volume to the local TPM */
static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL;
static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL;
static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC;
static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */
static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = NULL;
static char *arg_link_keyring = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_type = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_description = NULL;
static char *arg_fixate_volume_key = NULL;

STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_keyring, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_type, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_description, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fixate_volume_key, freep);

static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = {
        [PASSPHRASE_REGULAR]      = "passphrase",
        [PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key",
        [PASSPHRASE_BOTH]         = "passphrase or recovery key",
};

DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(passphrase_type, PassphraseType);

static const char* const token_type_table[_TOKEN_TYPE_MAX] = {
        [TOKEN_TPM2]   = "tpm2",
        [TOKEN_FIDO2]  = "fido2",
        [TOKEN_PKCS11] = "pkcs11",
};

DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(token_type, TokenType);

/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
    check=
    checkargs=
    noearly
    loud
    quiet
    keyscript=
    initramfs
*/

static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
        const char *val;
        int r;

        assert(option);

        /* Handled outside of this tool */
        if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout"))
                return 0;

        if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout="))
                return 0;

        if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) {
                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) {

                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                if (arg_key_size % 8) {
                        log_warning("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring.");
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_key_size /= 8;

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) {

                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                if (arg_sector_size % 2) {
                        log_warning("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring.");
                        return 0;
                }

                if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)
                        log_warning("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) ||
                   (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) {

                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
                r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) {

                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
                if (path_is_absolute(val)) {
                        if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0)
                                return log_oom();
                } else
                        log_warning("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute, ignoring.", val);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) {

                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) {

                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_keyfile_erase = r;

        } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase"))
                arg_keyfile_erase = true;

        else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) {
                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) {
                if (!arg_type || !STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
                        arg_type = ANY_LUKS;

                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                               "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);

                if (arg_header)
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                               "Duplicate header= option, refusing.");

                arg_header = strdup(val);
                if (!arg_header)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) {

                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only"))
                arg_readonly = true;
        else if (streq(option, "verify"))
                arg_verify = true;
        else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) {
                if (streq(val, "masked"))
                        arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT);
                else {
                        r = parse_boolean(val);
                        if (r < 0) {
                                log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val);
                                return 0;
                        }

                        SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r);
                        SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r);
                }
        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-cache="))) {
                arg_password_cache_set = true;

                if (streq(val, "read-only")) {
                        arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
                        arg_ask_password_flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE;
                } else {
                        r = parse_boolean(val);
                        if (r < 0) {
                                log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-cache= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val);
                                return 0;
                        }

                        SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, r);
                }
        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard"))
                arg_discards = true;
        else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt"))
                arg_same_cpu_crypt = true;
        else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus"))
                arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true;
        else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue"))
                arg_no_read_workqueue = true;
        else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue"))
                arg_no_write_workqueue = true;
        else if (streq(option, "luks"))
                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
        else if (streq(option, "bitlk"))
                arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK;
        else if (streq(option, "tcrypt"))
                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
        else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) {
                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
                arg_tcrypt_hidden = true;
        } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
                arg_tcrypt_system = true;
        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) {
                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
                arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "veracrypt-pim="))) {

                r = safe_atou32(val, &arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }
        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") ||
                   startswith(option, "tmp="))
                arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
        else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) {

                r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) {

                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) {

                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) {

                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
                        arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true;
                } else {
                        if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val))
                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing.");

                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return log_oom();

                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
                }

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) {

                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
                        arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
                        arg_fido2_device_auto = true;
                } else {
                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return log_oom();

                        arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
                }

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) {

                if (streq(val, "auto"))
                        arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid);
                else {
                        _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL;
                        size_t cid_size;

                        r = unbase64mem(val, &cid, &cid_size);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m");

                        free(arg_fido2_cid);
                        arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid);
                        arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size;
                }

                /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */
                if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto)
                        arg_fido2_device_auto = true;

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) {

                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-pin="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED;
                SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_PIN, r);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-up="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED;
                SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UP, r);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-uv="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT;
                SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UV, r);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) {

                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
                        arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = true;
                } else {
                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return log_oom();

                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
                }

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) {

                r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) {

                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                               "TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);

                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_tpm2_pin = r;

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrlock="))) {

                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                               "TPM2 pcrlock policy path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);

                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_pcrlock, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-pcr="))) {
                unsigned pcr;

                r = safe_atou(val, &pcr);
                if (r < 0) {
                        r = parse_boolean(val);
                        if (r < 0) {
                                log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                                return 0;
                        }

                        pcr = r ? TPM2_PCR_SYSTEM_IDENTITY : UINT_MAX;
                } else if (!TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(pcr)) {
                        log_warning("Selected TPM index for measurement %u outside of allowed range 0…%u, ignoring.", pcr, TPM2_PCRS_MAX-1);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = pcr;

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) {

#if HAVE_OPENSSL
                _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;

                l = strv_split(val, ":");
                if (!l)
                        return log_oom();

                STRV_FOREACH(i, l) {
                        const EVP_MD *implementation;

                        implementation = EVP_get_digestbyname(*i);
                        if (!implementation)
                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val);

                        if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, EVP_MD_name(implementation)) < 0)
                                return log_oom();
                }
#else
                log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-keyslot-nvpcr="))) {

                r = isempty(val) ? false : parse_boolean(val);
                if (r == 0) {
                        arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = mfree(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr);
                        return 0;
                }
                if (r > 0)
                        val = "cryptsetup";
                else if (!tpm2_nvpcr_name_is_valid(val)) {
                        log_warning("Invalid NvPCR name, ignoring: %s", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                if (free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, val) < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                arg_try_empty_password = r;

        } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password"))
                arg_try_empty_password = true;
        else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) {

                r = parse_boolean(val);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
                        return 0;
                }

                SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS, r);
        } else if (streq(option, "headless"))
                arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS;

        else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) {

                r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec);
                if (r < 0)
                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);

        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "link-volume-key="))) {
#if HAVE_CRYPT_SET_KEYRING_TO_LINK
                _cleanup_free_ char *keyring = NULL, *key_type = NULL, *key_description = NULL;
                const char *sep;

                /* Stick with cryptsetup --link-vk-to-keyring format
                 * <keyring_description>::%<key_type>:<key_description>,
                 * where %<key_type> is optional and defaults to 'user'.
                 */
                sep = strstr(val, "::");
                if (!sep)
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val);

                /* cryptsetup (cli) supports <keyring_description> passed in various formats:
                 * - well-known keyrings prefixed with '@' (@u user, @s session, etc)
                 * - text descriptions prefixed with "%:" or "%keyring:".
                 * - text description with no prefix.
                 * - numeric keyring id (ignored in current patch set). */
                keyring = strndup(val, sep - val);
                if (!keyring)
                        return log_oom();

                /* add type prefix if missing (crypt_set_keyring_to_link() expects it) */
                if (!IN_SET(*keyring, '@', '%'))
                        if (!strprepend(&keyring, "%:"))
                                return log_oom();

                sep += 2;

                /* %<key_type> is optional (and defaults to 'user') */
                if (*sep == '%') {
                        /* must be separated by colon */
                        const char *c = strchr(sep, ':');
                        if (!c)
                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val);

                        key_type = strndup(sep + 1, c - sep - 1);
                        if (!key_type)
                                return log_oom();

                        sep = c + 1;
                }

                key_description = strdup(sep);
                if (!key_description)
                        return log_oom();

                free_and_replace(arg_link_keyring, keyring);
                free_and_replace(arg_link_key_type, key_type);
                free_and_replace(arg_link_key_description, key_description);
#else
                log_error("Build lacks libcryptsetup support for linking volume keys in user specified kernel keyrings upon device activation, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif
        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fixate-volume-key="))) {
                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fixate_volume_key, val);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_oom();

        } else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
                log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);

        return 0;
}

static int parse_crypt_config(const char *options) {
        assert(options);

        for (;;) {
                _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
                int r;

                r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m");
                if (r == 0)
                        break;

                r = parse_one_option(word);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;
        }

        /* sanity-check options */
        if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
                if (arg_offset != 0)
                      log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
                if (arg_skip != 0)
                      log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
        }

        if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) {
                /* If password-cache was not configured explicitly, default to no cache for PKCS#11 */
                if (!arg_password_cache_set)
                        arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE);

                /* This prevents future backward-compatibility issues if we decide to allow caching for PKCS#11 */
                if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED))
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                               "Password cache is not supported for PKCS#11 security tokens.");
        }

        return 0;
}

static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
        static const char name_fields[] =
                "DM_NAME\0"
                "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
                "ID_MODEL\0";

        _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL;
        const char *name;
        struct stat st;

        assert(path);

        if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
                return NULL;

        if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
                return NULL;

        if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0)
                return NULL;

        if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) {
                _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL;
                ssize_t l;

                /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's
                 * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or
                 * other weird stuff. */

                l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped);
                if (l < 0) {
                        log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m");
                        return NULL;
                }

                if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL))
                        return TAKE_PTR(unescaped);
        }

        /* These need no unescaping. */
        NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields)
                if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 &&
                    !isempty(name))
                        return strdup(name);

        return NULL;
}

static char* disk_mount_point(const char *label) {
        _cleanup_(mnt_free_tablep) struct libmnt_table *table = NULL;
        _cleanup_(mnt_free_iterp) struct libmnt_iter *iter = NULL;
        _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
        int r;

        /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */

        assert(label);

        device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label);
        if (!device)
                return NULL;

        r = libmount_parse_fstab(&table, &iter);
        if (r < 0)
                return NULL;

        for (;;) {
                struct libmnt_fs *fs;

                r = sym_mnt_table_next_fs(table, iter, &fs);
                if (r != 0)
                        return NULL;

                if (path_equal(sym_mnt_fs_get_source(fs), device)) {
                        const char *target = sym_mnt_fs_get_target(fs);
                        if (target)
                                return strdup(target);
                }
        }
}

static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) {
        _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
        char *name_buffer = NULL;
        int r;

        assert(src);
        assert(vol);

        description = disk_description(src);
        mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);

        /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */
        if (description && streq(vol, description))
                description = mfree(description);

        if (mount_point && description)
                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
        else if (mount_point)
                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
        else if (description)
                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
        else
                return strdup(vol);
        if (r < 0)
                return NULL;

        return name_buffer;
}

static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) {
        _cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL;
        int slot_max;
        PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;

        assert(cd);

        if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
                log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
                return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
        }

        /* Search all used slots */
        assert_se((slot_max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0);
        slots = new(bool, slot_max);
        if (!slots)
                return log_oom();

        for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
                slots[slot] = IN_SET(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST);

        /* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */
        for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
                _cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL;
                const char *type;
                sd_json_variant *w, *z;
                int tk;

                tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v);
                if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL))
                        continue;
                if (tk < 0) {
                        log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m");
                        continue;
                }

                w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "type");
                if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_string(w)) {
                        log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring.");
                        continue;
                }

                type = sd_json_variant_string(w);
                if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) {

                        /* At least exists one recovery key */
                        if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery"))
                                passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY;

                        w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots");
                        if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_array(w)) {
                                log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring.");
                                continue;
                        }

                        JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) {
                                unsigned u;
                                int at;

                                if (!sd_json_variant_is_string(z)) {
                                        log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring.");
                                        continue;
                                }

                                at = safe_atou(sd_json_variant_string(z), &u);
                                if (at < 0) {
                                        log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring.");
                                        continue;
                                }

                                if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) {
                                        log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring.");
                                        continue;
                                }

                                slots[u] = false;
                        }
                }
        }

        /* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */
        for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
                if (slots[slot]) {
                        passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
                        break;
                }

        /* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled,
         * we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */
        return passphrase_type;
}

static int get_password(
                const char *vol,
                const char *src,
                usec_t until,
                bool ignore_cached,
                PassphraseType passphrase_type,
                char ***ret) {

        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL, *id = NULL;
        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
        AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags;
        int r;

        assert(vol);
        assert(src);
        assert(ret);

        if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option.");

        friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol);
        if (!friendly)
                return log_oom();

        if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
                return log_oom();

        disk_path = cescape(src);
        if (!disk_path)
                return log_oom();

        id = strjoin("cryptsetup:", disk_path);
        if (!id)
                return log_oom();

        AskPasswordRequest req = {
                .tty_fd = -EBADF,
                .message = text,
                .icon = "drive-harddisk",
                .id = id,
                .keyring = "cryptsetup",
                .credential = "cryptsetup.passphrase",
                .until = until,
                .hup_fd = -EBADF,
        };

        if (ignore_cached)
                flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;

        r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");

        if (arg_verify) {
                _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;

                assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);

                text = mfree(text);
                if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
                        return log_oom();

                free(id);
                id = strjoin("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path);
                if (!id)
                        return log_oom();

                req.message = text;
                req.id = id;

                r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords2);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");

                assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);

                if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0]))
                        return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                 "Passwords did not match, retrying.");
        }

        strv_uniq(passwords);

        STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
                char *c;

                if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
                        continue;

                /* Pad password if necessary */
                c = new(char, arg_key_size);
                if (!c)
                        return log_oom();

                strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
                erase_and_free(*p);
                *p = TAKE_PTR(c);
        }

        *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords);

        return 0;
}

static int measure_volume_key(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const void *volume_key,
                size_t volume_key_size) {

        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(volume_key);
        assert(volume_key_size > 0);

        if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
                log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
                return 0;
        }

        r = efi_measured_os(LOG_WARNING);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;
        if (r == 0) {
                log_debug("OS measurements not explicitly requested and kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace volume key measurement, too.");
                return 0;
        }

#if HAVE_TPM2
        _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
        r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;

        _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
        if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) {
                r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");
        }

        _cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", ");
        if (!joined)
                return log_oom();

        /* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an
         * unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead
         * send a HMAC signature instead. */

        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;

        /* Note: what is extended to the SHA256 bank here must match the expected hash of 'fixate-volume-key='
         * calculated by cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(). */
        r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_prefix(cd, name, &prefix);
        if (r)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");

        r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes(
                        c,
                        /* banks= */ l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks,
                        /* pcr_index = */ arg_tpm2_measure_pcr,
                        /* data = */ &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(prefix),
                        /* secret = */ &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size),
                        /* event_type = */ TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY,
                        /* description = */ prefix);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m");

        log_struct(LOG_INFO,
                   LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR),
                   LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, prefix, joined),
                   LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", prefix),
                   LOG_ITEM("PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr),
                   LOG_ITEM("BANKS=%s", joined));

        return 0;
#else
        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring volume key.");
#endif
}

static int measure_keyslot(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *mechanism,
                int keyslot) {

#if HAVE_TPM2
        int r;
#endif
        assert(cd);
        assert(name);

        if (!arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr) {
                log_debug("Not measuring unlock keyslot, deactivated.");
                return 0;
        }

#if HAVE_TPM2
        r = efi_measured_os(LOG_WARNING);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;
        if (r == 0) {
                log_debug("OS measurements not explicitly requested and kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace key slot measurement, too.");
                return 0;
        }

        _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
        r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;

        _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
        escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */
        if (!escaped)
                return log_oom();

        _cleanup_free_ char *k = NULL;
        if (keyslot >= 0 && asprintf(&k, "%i", keyslot) < 0)
                return log_oom();

        _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
        s = strjoin("cryptsetup-keyslot:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd)), ":", strempty(mechanism), ":", strempty(k));
        if (!s)
                return log_oom();

        r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s);
        if (r == -ENETDOWN) {
                /* NvPCR is not initialized yet. Do so now. */
                _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec anchor_secret = {};
                r = tpm2_nvpcr_acquire_anchor_secret(&anchor_secret, /* sync_secondary= */ false);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

                r = tpm2_nvpcr_initialize(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &anchor_secret);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extend NvPCR index '%s' with anchor secret: %m", name);

                r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s);
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend NvPCR: %m");

        log_struct(LOG_INFO,
                   "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_NVPCR_EXTEND_STR,
                   LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended NvPCR index '%s' with '%s'.", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, s),
                   "MEASURING=%s", s,
                   "NVPCR=%s", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr);

        return 0;
#else
        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring keyslot.");
#endif
}

static int log_external_activation(int r, const char *volume) {
        assert(volume);

        log_notice_errno(r, "Volume '%s' has been activated externally while we have been trying to activate it.", volume);
        return 0;
}

static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *mechanism,
                int keyslot,
                const void *volume_key,
                size_t volume_key_size,
                uint32_t flags) {

        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);

        /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */

        /* First, check if volume key digest matches the expectation. */
        if (arg_fixate_volume_key) {
                 _cleanup_free_ char *key_id = NULL;

                 r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(
                                 cd,
                                 /* volume_name= */ name,
                                 /* volume_key= */ volume_key,
                                 /* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
                                 /* ret= */ &key_id);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get volume key id.");

                 if (!streq(arg_fixate_volume_key, key_id))
                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                                "Volume key id: '%s' does not match the expectation: '%s'.",
                                                key_id, arg_fixate_volume_key);
        }

        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags);
        if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                return log_external_activation(r, name);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;

        if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
                log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
                return 0;
        }

        if (volume_key_size > 0)
                (void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */
        else
                log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none specified.");

        (void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot); /* ditto */
        return r;
}

static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *mechanism,
                int keyslot,
                const char *passphrase,
                size_t passphrase_size,
                uint32_t flags) {

        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL;
        size_t vks;
        int r;

        assert(cd);

        /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's
         * requested. Note that we may need the volume key for the measurement and/or for the comparison, and
         * crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and
         * retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */

        if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX && !arg_fixate_volume_key)
                goto shortcut;

        r = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;
        if (r == 0) {
                log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none defined.");
                goto shortcut;
        }

        vk = malloc(vks = r);
        if (!vk)
                return -ENOMEM;

        keyslot = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot, vk, &vks, passphrase, passphrase_size);
        if (keyslot < 0)
                return keyslot;

        return measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot, vk, vks, flags);

shortcut:
        keyslot = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
        if (keyslot == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                return log_external_activation(keyslot, name);
        if (keyslot < 0)
                return keyslot;

        (void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot);
        return keyslot;
}

static int attach_tcrypt(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                TokenType token_type,
                const char *key_file,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                char **passwords,
                uint32_t flags) {

        int r = 0;
        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL;
        struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
                .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
                .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles,
                .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles)
        };

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));

        if (token_type >= 0)
                /* Ask for a regular password */
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                       "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support.");

        if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;

        if (arg_tcrypt_system)
                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;

        if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;

        if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt && arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim != 0)
                params.veracrypt_pim = arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim;

        if (key_data) {
                params.passphrase = key_data->iov_base;
                params.passphrase_size = key_data->iov_len;
                r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
        } else if (key_file) {
                r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
                if (r < 0) {
                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file);
                        return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
                }
                params.passphrase = passphrase;
                params.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase);
                r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
        } else {
                r = -EINVAL;
                STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords){
                        params.passphrase = *p;
                        params.passphrase_size = strlen(*p);
                        r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
                        if (r >= 0)
                                break;
                }
        }

        if (r < 0) {
                if (r == -EPERM) {
                        if (key_data)
                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)");
                        else if (key_file)
                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file);
                        else
                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using supplied passwords.");

                        return r;
                }

                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
        }

        r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                        cd,
                        name,
                        /* mechanism= */ NULL,
                        /* keyslot= */ -1,
                        /* volume_key= */ NULL,
                        /* volume_key_size= */ 0,
                        flags);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));

        return 0;
}

static char *make_bindname(const char *volume, TokenType token_type) {
        const char *token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type), *suffix;
        char *bindname;
        int r;

        switch (token_type) {

        case TOKEN_FIDO2:
                suffix = "-salt";
                break;

        default:
                suffix = NULL;
        }

        r = asprintf(&bindname,
                     "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup%s%s%s/%s",
                     random_u64(),
                     token_type_name ? "-" : "",
                     strempty(token_type_name),
                     strempty(suffix),
                     volume);
        if (r < 0)
                return NULL;

        return bindname;
}

static int make_security_device_monitor(
                sd_event **ret_event,
                sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {
        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
        int r;

        assert(ret_event);
        assert(ret_monitor);

        /* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */
        log_debug("Creating device monitor for tag 'security-device' with timeout %s",
                  FORMAT_TIMESPAN(arg_token_timeout_usec, 1*USEC_PER_SEC));

        r = sd_event_default(&event);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");

        r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");

        (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device");

        r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device");
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");

        *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
        *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
        return 0;
}

static int run_security_device_monitor(
                sd_event *event,
                sd_device_monitor *monitor) {
        bool processed = false;
        int r;

        assert(event);
        assert(monitor);

        /* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the timeout is
         * hit. */

        for (;;) {
                int x;

                r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x);
                if (r < 0) {
                        if (r != -ENODATA)
                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m");

                        /* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */
                } else {
                        assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT);
                        return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                "Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt.");
                }

                /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */
                r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
                if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */
                        return 0;

                processed = true;
        }
}

static bool use_token_plugins(void) {

#if HAVE_TPM2
        /* Currently, there's no way for us to query the volume key when plugins are used. Hence don't use
         * plugins, if measurement has been requested. */
        if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX)
                return false;
        if (arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr)
                return false;
        /* Volume key is also needed if the expected key id is set */
        if (arg_fixate_volume_key)
                return false;
#endif

        /* Disable tokens if we're in FIDO2 mode with manual parameters. */
        if (arg_fido2_cid)
                return false;

#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
        int r;

        /* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */
        r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE");
        if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
                log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m");
        if (r == 0)
                return false;

        return crypt_token_external_path();
#else
        return false;
#endif
}

#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) {
        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL;
        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
        int r;

        assert(ret_pins);

        r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m");
        if (r > 0) {
                pins = strv_new(envpin);
                if (!pins)
                        return log_oom();
        }

        *ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins);

        return 0;
}
#endif

static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *type,
                usec_t until,
                void *userdata,
                uint32_t activation_flags,
                const char *message,
                const char *keyring,
                const char *credential) {

#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
        AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags;
        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
        int r;

        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, /* pin= */ NULL, /* pin_size= */ 0, userdata, activation_flags);
        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
                return 0;
        if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                return log_external_activation(r, name);
        if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
                return r;

        r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins);
        if (r < 0)
                return r;

        STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
                r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags);
                if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
                        return 0;
                if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                        return log_external_activation(r, name);
                if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
                        return r;
        }

        if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable.");

        for (;;) {
                pins = strv_free_erase(pins);

                AskPasswordRequest req = {
                        .tty_fd = -EBADF,
                        .message = message,
                        .icon = "drive-harddisk",
                        .keyring = keyring,
                        .credential = credential,
                        .until = until,
                        .hup_fd = -EBADF,
                };

                r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &pins);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

                STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
                        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags);
                        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
                                return 0;
                        if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                                return log_external_activation(r, name);
                        if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
                                return r;
                }

                flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
        }
        return r;
#else
        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}

static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                usec_t until,
                void *userdata,
                uint32_t activation_flags) {

        return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
                        cd,
                        name,
                        "systemd-fido2",
                        until,
                        userdata,
                        activation_flags,
                        "Please enter security token PIN:",
                        "fido2-pin",
                        "cryptsetup.fido2-pin");
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *key_file,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                usec_t until,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
        size_t decrypted_key_size;
        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
        bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto);

        if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                        "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing.");

        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
        if (!friendly)
                return log_oom();

        for (;;) {
                if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) {
                        r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_fido2_device, flags);
                        if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT))
                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                       "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");

                } else {
                        if (arg_fido2_cid)
                                r = acquire_fido2_key(
                                                name,
                                                friendly,
                                                arg_fido2_device,
                                                arg_fido2_rp_id,
                                                arg_fido2_cid, arg_fido2_cid_size,
                                                key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
                                                key_data,
                                                until,
                                                arg_fido2_manual_flags,
                                                "cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
                                                arg_ask_password_flags,
                                                &decrypted_key,
                                                &decrypted_key_size);
                        else
                                r = acquire_fido2_key_auto(
                                                cd,
                                                name,
                                                friendly,
                                                arg_fido2_device,
                                                until,
                                                "cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
                                                arg_ask_password_flags,
                                                &decrypted_key,
                                                &decrypted_key_size);
                        if (r >= 0)
                                break;
                }

                if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
                        return r;

                if (!monitor) {
                        /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
                         * create an event loop and monitor first. */

                        assert(!event);

                        r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return r;

                        log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly);

                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
                         * to create and configure the monitor */
                        continue;
                }

                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2...");
        }

        if (pass_volume_key)
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "fido2",
                                /* keyslot= */ -1,
                                decrypted_key,
                                decrypted_key_size,
                                flags);
        else {
                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
                ssize_t base64_encoded_size;

                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */

                base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
                if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
                        return log_oom();

                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "fido2",
                                keyslot,
                                base64_encoded,
                                base64_encoded_size,
                                flags);
        }
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m");

        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *friendly_name,
                usec_t until,
                const char *askpw_credential,
                uint32_t flags) {

#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
        int r;

        if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device.");

        systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = {
                .friendly_name = friendly_name,
                .until = until,
                .askpw_credential = askpw_credential,
                .askpw_flags = arg_ask_password_flags,
        };

        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, &params, flags);
        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
                r = 0;
        if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
                r = log_external_activation(r, name);

        return r;
#else
        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *key_file,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                usec_t until,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL;
        size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0;
        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
        _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL;
        struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
        const char *uri = NULL;
        bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto);

        if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) {
                if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) {
                        r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot);
                        if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO))
                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                       "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                        if (r < 0)
                                return r;

                        uri = discovered_uri;
                        discovered_key_data = IOVEC_MAKE(discovered_key, discovered_key_size);
                        key_data = &discovered_key_data;
                }
        } else {
                uri = arg_pkcs11_uri;

                if (!key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
        }

        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
        if (!friendly)
                return log_oom();

        for (;;) {
                if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
                        r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(
                                        cd,
                                        name,
                                        friendly,
                                        until,
                                        "cryptsetup.pkcs11-pin",
                                        flags);
                else {
                        r = decrypt_pkcs11_key(
                                        name,
                                        friendly,
                                        uri,
                                        key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
                                        key_data,
                                        until,
                                        arg_ask_password_flags,
                                        &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
                        if (r >= 0)
                                break;
                }

                if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
                        return r;

                if (!monitor) {
                        /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
                         * create an event loop and monitor first. */

                        assert(!event);

                        r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return r;

                        log_notice("Security token%s%s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.",
                                   uri ? " " : "", strempty(uri), friendly);

                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
                         * to create and configure the monitor */
                        continue;
                }

                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11...");
        }
        assert(decrypted_key);

        if (pass_volume_key)
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "pkcs11",
                                /* keyslot= */ -1,
                                decrypted_key,
                                decrypted_key_size,
                                flags);
        else {
                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
                ssize_t base64_encoded_size;

                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
                 * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
                 * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
                 * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
                 * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
                 * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
                 * via base64 encoding. */

                base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
                if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
                        return log_oom();

                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "pkcs11",
                                keyslot,
                                base64_encoded,
                                base64_encoded_size,
                                flags);
        }
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m");

        return 0;
}

static int make_tpm2_device_monitor(
                sd_event **ret_event,
                sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {

        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
        int r;

        assert(ret_event);
        assert(ret_monitor);

        r = sd_event_default(&event);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");

        r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");

        (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm");

        r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");

        r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");

        *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
        *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                usec_t until,
                uint32_t flags) {

#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
        systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = {
                .search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
                .device = arg_tpm2_device,
                .signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature,
                .pcrlock_path = arg_tpm2_pcrlock,
        };

        if (!use_token_plugins())
                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
                                       "libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled.");

        return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
                        cd,
                        name,
                        "systemd-tpm2",
                        until,
                        &params,
                        flags,
                        "Please enter TPM2 PIN:",
                        "tpm2-pin",
                        "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin");
#else
        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *key_file,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                usec_t until,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
        _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec decrypted_key = {};
        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto);

        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
        if (!friendly)
                return log_oom();

        for (;;) {
                if (key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data)) {
                        /* If key data is specified, use that */

                        r = acquire_tpm2_key(
                                        name,
                                        arg_tpm2_device,
                                        arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT_LEGACY : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
                                        UINT16_MAX,
                                        /* pubkey= */ NULL,
                                        /* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0,
                                        /* signature_path= */ NULL,
                                        /* pcrlock_path= */ NULL,
                                        /* primary_alg= */ 0,
                                        key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
                                        key_data, /* n_blobs= */ 1,
                                        /* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* we don't know the policy hash */
                                        /* n_policy_hash= */ 0,
                                        /* salt= */ NULL,
                                        /* srk= */ NULL,
                                        /* pcrlock_nv= */ NULL,
                                        arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0,
                                        until,
                                        "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin",
                                        arg_ask_password_flags,
                                        &decrypted_key);
                        if (r >= 0)
                                break;
                        if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                        if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                        /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
                        if (r != -EAGAIN) {
                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
                        }
                } else {
                        r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, flags);
                        if (r >= 0)
                                return 0;
                        /* EAGAIN     means: no tpm2 chip found
                         * EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */
                        if (r == -ENXIO)
                                return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                        "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                        if (r == -ENOENT)
                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                       "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                        if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) {
                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
                        }
                }

                if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */
                        bool found_some = false;
                        int token = 0; /* first token to look at */

                        /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support
                         * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them
                         * works. */

                        for (;;) {
                                _cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec pubkey = {}, salt = {}, srk = {}, pcrlock_nv = {};
                                struct iovec *blobs = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
                                uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask;
                                size_t n_blobs = 0, n_policy_hash = 0;
                                uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
                                TPM2Flags tpm2_flags;

                                CLEANUP_ARRAY(blobs, n_blobs, iovec_array_free);
                                CLEANUP_ARRAY(policy_hash, n_policy_hash, iovec_array_free);

                                r = find_tpm2_auto_data(
                                                cd,
                                                arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */
                                                token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */
                                                &hash_pcr_mask,
                                                &pcr_bank,
                                                &pubkey,
                                                &pubkey_pcr_mask,
                                                &primary_alg,
                                                &blobs,
                                                &n_blobs,
                                                &policy_hash,
                                                &n_policy_hash,
                                                &salt,
                                                &srk,
                                                &pcrlock_nv,
                                                &tpm2_flags,
                                                &keyslot,
                                                &token);
                                if (r == -ENXIO)
                                        /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */
                                        return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG,
                                                              SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                              found_some
                                                              ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."
                                                              : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                                if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
                                        /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
                                        return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                               "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                                if (r < 0)
                                        return r;

                                found_some = true;

                                r = acquire_tpm2_key(
                                                name,
                                                arg_tpm2_device,
                                                hash_pcr_mask,
                                                pcr_bank,
                                                &pubkey,
                                                pubkey_pcr_mask,
                                                arg_tpm2_signature,
                                                arg_tpm2_pcrlock,
                                                primary_alg,
                                                /* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */
                                                blobs,
                                                n_blobs,
                                                policy_hash,
                                                n_policy_hash,
                                                &salt,
                                                &srk,
                                                &pcrlock_nv,
                                                tpm2_flags,
                                                until,
                                                "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin",
                                                arg_ask_password_flags,
                                                &decrypted_key);
                                if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
                                        return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
                                if (r != -EPERM)
                                        break;

                                token++; /* try a different token next time */
                        }

                        if (r >= 0)
                                break;
                        /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
                        if (r != -EAGAIN) {
                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
                        }
                }

                if (!monitor) {
                        /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create
                         * an event loop and monitor first. */

                        assert(!event);

                        if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2())
                                return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
                                                        "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking.");

                        r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return r;

                        log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly);

                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed
                         * to create and configure the monitor */
                        continue;
                }

                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;

                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2...");
        }

        if (pass_volume_key)
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "tpm2",
                                /* keyslot= */ -1,
                                decrypted_key.iov_base,
                                decrypted_key.iov_len,
                                flags);
        else {
                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
                ssize_t base64_encoded_size;

                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */

                base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key.iov_base, decrypted_key.iov_len, &base64_encoded);
                if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
                        return log_oom();

                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
                                cd,
                                name,
                                "tpm2",
                                keyslot,
                                base64_encoded,
                                base64_encoded_size,
                                flags);
        }
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m");

        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(key_data);

        if (pass_volume_key)
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags);
        else
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags);
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)");
                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m");

        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                const char *key_file,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL;
        _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
        size_t kfsize;
        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);
        assert(key_file);

        /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */
        bindname = make_bindname(name, /* token_type= */ _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID);
        if (!bindname)
                return log_oom();

        r = read_full_file_full(
                        AT_FDCWD, key_file,
                        arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset,
                        arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size,
                        READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
                        bindname,
                        &kfdata, &kfsize);
        if (r == -E2BIG) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file);
                return -EAGAIN;
        }
        if (r == -ENOENT) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file);
                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file);

        if (pass_volume_key)
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
        else
                r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file);
                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);

        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                char **passwords,
                uint32_t flags,
                bool pass_volume_key) {

        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);

        r = -EINVAL;
        STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
                if (pass_volume_key)
                        r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, *p, arg_key_size, flags);
                else
                        r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags);
                if (r >= 0)
                        break;
        }
        if (r == -EPERM) {
                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)");
                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m");

        return 0;
}

static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
                struct crypt_device *cd,
                const char *name,
                TokenType token_type,
                const char *key_file,
                const struct iovec *key_data,
                char **passwords,
                uint32_t flags,
                usec_t until) {

        bool pass_volume_key = false;
        int r;

        assert(cd);
        assert(name);

        if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
                struct crypt_params_plain params = {
                        .offset = arg_offset,
                        .skip = arg_skip,
                        .sector_size = arg_sector_size,
                };
                const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
                _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;

                if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain"))
                        /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */
                        params.hash = NULL;
                else if (arg_hash)
                        params.hash = arg_hash;
                else if (!key_file)
                        /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key
                         * file is provided */
                        params.hash = "ripemd160";

                if (arg_cipher) {
                        size_t l;

                        l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-");
                        truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l);
                        if (!truncated_cipher)
                                return log_oom();

                        cipher = truncated_cipher;
                        cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain";
                } else {
                        cipher = "aes";
                        cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
                }

                /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */
                arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size;

                /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format
                 * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */
                r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, &params);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m");

                /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
                pass_volume_key = !params.hash;
        }

        log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.",
                 crypt_get_cipher(cd),
                 crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
                 crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
                 crypt_get_device_name(cd));

        if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2)
                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
        if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2)
                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
        if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11)
                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
        if (key_data)
                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, flags, pass_volume_key);
        if (key_file)
                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key);

        return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key);
}

static int help(void) {
        _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
        int r;

        r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup", "8", &link);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_oom();

        printf("%1$s attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG]\n"
               "%1$s detach VOLUME\n\n"
               "%2$sAttach or detach an encrypted block device.%3$s\n\n"
               "  -h --help            Show this help\n"
               "     --version         Show package version\n"
               "\nSee the %4$s for details.\n",
               program_invocation_short_name,
               ansi_highlight(),
               ansi_normal(),
               link);

        return 0;
}

static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
        enum {
                ARG_VERSION = 0x100,
        };

        static const struct option options[] = {
                { "help",                         no_argument,       NULL, 'h'                       },
                { "version",                      no_argument,       NULL, ARG_VERSION               },
                {}
        };

        int c;

        assert(argc >= 0);
        assert(argv);

        if (argv_looks_like_help(argc, argv))
                return help();

        while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "h", options, NULL)) >= 0)
                switch (c) {

                case 'h':
                        return help();

                case ARG_VERSION:
                        return version();

                case '?':
                        return -EINVAL;

                default:
                        assert_not_reached();
                }

        return 1;
}

static uint32_t determine_flags(void) {
        uint32_t flags = 0;

        if (arg_readonly)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;

        if (arg_discards)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;

        if (arg_same_cpu_crypt)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;

        if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;

        if (arg_no_read_workqueue)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;

        if (arg_no_write_workqueue)
                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;

        /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */
        /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */
        flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;

        return flags;
}

static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) {
        int r;

        assert(p);

        if (!*p)
                return;

        r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE);
        if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
                log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p);
}

static TokenType determine_token_type(void) {
        if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
                return TOKEN_TPM2;
        if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto)
                return TOKEN_FIDO2;
        if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
                return TOKEN_PKCS11;

        return _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID;
}

static int discover_key(const char *key_file, const char *volume, TokenType token_type, struct iovec *ret_key_data) {
        _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
        const char *token_type_name;
        int r;

        assert(key_file);
        assert(volume);
        assert(ret_key_data);

        bindname = make_bindname(volume, token_type);
        if (!bindname)
                return log_oom();

        /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined search path, and load it. */
        r = find_key_file(key_file, STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), bindname, ret_key_data);
        if (r <= 0)
                return r;

        token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type);
        if (token_type_name)
                log_debug("Automatically discovered encrypted key for volume '%s' (token type: %s).", volume, token_type_name);
        else
                log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume);

        return r;
}

static int verb_attach(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) {
        _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
        _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL;
        crypt_status_info status;
        uint32_t flags = 0;
        unsigned tries;
        usec_t until;
        PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;
        int r;

        /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG] */

        assert(argc >= 3 && argc <= 5);

        const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]),
                *source = ASSERT_PTR(argv[2]),
                *key_file = argc >= 4 ? mangle_none(argv[3]) : NULL,
                *config = argc >= 5 ? mangle_none(argv[4]) : NULL;

        if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);

        if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) {
                log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file);
                key_file = NULL;
        }

        if (config) {
                r = parse_crypt_config(config);
                if (r < 0)
                        return r;
        }

        log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__,
                  volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));

        /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
        (void) safe_mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);

        if (key_file && arg_keyfile_erase)
                destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */

        if (arg_header) {
                if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)){
                        log_debug("tcrypt header: %s", arg_header);
                        r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, arg_header, source);
                } else {
                        log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
                        r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
                }
        } else
                r = crypt_init(&cd, source);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m");

        cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);

        status = crypt_status(cd, volume);
        if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) {
                log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume);
                return 0;
        }

        flags = determine_flags();

        until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout);
        if (until == USEC_INFINITY)
                until = 0;

        if (arg_key_size == 0)
                arg_key_size = 256U / 8U;

        if (key_file) {
                struct stat st;

                /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a warning it's OK to do this
                 * in two steps. */
                if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
                        log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
        }

        if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
                r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));

/* since cryptsetup 2.7.0 (Jan 2024) */
#if HAVE_CRYPT_SET_KEYRING_TO_LINK
                if (arg_link_key_description) {
                        r = crypt_set_keyring_to_link(cd, arg_link_key_description, NULL, arg_link_key_type, arg_link_keyring);
                        if (r < 0)
                                log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to set keyring or key description to link volume key in, ignoring: %m");
                }
#endif

                if (arg_header) {
                        r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source);
                }

                /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */
                if (!key_file && use_token_plugins()) {
                        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
                                        cd,
                                        volume,
                                        /* type= */ NULL,
                                        until,
                                        /* userdata= */ NULL,
                                        flags,
                                        "Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:",
                                        "luks2-pin",
                                        "cryptsetup.luks2-pin");
                        if (r >= 0) {
                                log_debug("Volume %s activated with a LUKS token.", volume);
                                return 0;
                        }

                        log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
                }
        }

        if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) {
                r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
                if (r < 0)
                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
        }

        bool use_cached_passphrase = true, try_discover_key = !key_file;
        const char *discovered_key_fn = strjoina(volume, ".key");
        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
        for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
                _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
                const struct iovec *key_data = NULL;
                TokenType token_type = determine_token_type();

                log_debug("Beginning attempt %u to unlock.", tries);

                /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
                 *
                 *    1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip
                 *    2. The configured or discovered key, of which both are exclusive and optional
                 *    3. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
                 *    4. We enquire the user for a password
                 */

                if (try_discover_key) {
                        r = discover_key(discovered_key_fn, volume, token_type, &discovered_key_data);
                        if (r < 0)
                                return r;
                        if (r > 0)
                                key_data = &discovered_key_data;
                }

                if (token_type < 0 && !key_file && !key_data && !passwords) {

                        /* If we have nothing to try anymore, then acquire a new password */

                        if (arg_try_empty_password) {
                                /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
                                arg_try_empty_password = false;
                                key_data = &iovec_empty;
                        } else {
                                /* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we
                                 * have nothing else to check for */
                                if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) {
                                        passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd);
                                        if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE)
                                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered.");
                                }

                                r = get_password(
                                                volume,
                                                source,
                                                until,
                                                /* ignore_cached= */ !use_cached_passphrase || arg_verify,
                                                passphrase_type,
                                                &passwords);
                                use_cached_passphrase = false;
                                if (r == -EAGAIN)
                                        continue;
                                if (r < 0)
                                        return r;
                        }
                }

                if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
                        r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags);
                else
                        r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags, until);
                if (r >= 0)
                        break;
                if (r != -EAGAIN)
                        return r;

                /* Key not correct? Let's try again, but let's invalidate one of the passed fields, so that
                 * we fall back to the next best thing. */

                if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2) {
                        arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
                        continue;
                }

                if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2) {
                        arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
                        arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
                        continue;
                }

                if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11) {
                        arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
                        continue;
                }

                if (try_discover_key) {
                        try_discover_key = false;
                        continue;
                }

                if (key_file) {
                        key_file = NULL;
                        continue;
                }

                if (passwords) {
                        passwords = strv_free_erase(passwords);
                        continue;
                }

                log_debug("Prepared for next attempt to unlock.");
        }

        if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up.");

        return 0;
}

static int verb_detach(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) {
        _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
        const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]);
        int r;

        assert(argc == 2);

        if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);

        r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume);
        if (r == -ENODEV) {
                log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume);
                return 0;
        }
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() for volume '%s' failed: %m", volume);

        cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);

        r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume);
        if (r < 0)
                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate '%s': %m", volume);

        return 0;
}

static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
        int r;

        log_setup();

        umask(0022);

        r = parse_argv(argc, argv);
        if (r <= 0)
                return r;

        cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL);

        static const Verb verbs[] = {
                { "attach", 3, 5, 0, verb_attach },
                { "detach", 2, 2, 0, verb_detach },
                {}
        };

        return dispatch_verb(argc, argv, verbs, NULL);
}

DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);

systemd / systemd / 23624534405

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