19012754211

Committed 02 Nov 2025 01:10PM UTC coverage: 90.677% (+0.006%) from 90.671%

Build # 19012754211

Build Type

push

github

Committed by

web-flow

Commit Message

Merge pull request #5137 from randombit/jack/clang-tidy-includes

Remove various unused includes flagged by clang-tidy misc-include-cleaner

Run Details

100457 of 110786 relevant lines covered (90.68%)

12189873.8 hits per line

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

91.18

/src/lib/tls/tls12/msg_server_kex.cpp

/*
* Server Key Exchange Message
* (C) 2004-2010,2012,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd
*     2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/

#include <botan/tls_messages.h>

#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
#include <botan/pubkey.h>
#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
#include <botan/internal/loadstor.h>
#include <botan/internal/target_info.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>

#include <botan/dh.h>

namespace Botan::TLS {

/**
* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
*/
Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,
                                         Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
                                         const Private_Key* signing_key) {
   const std::string hostname = state.client_hello()->sni_hostname();
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      std::string identity_hint = creds.psk_identity_hint("tls-server", hostname);

      append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);
   }

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
      const std::vector<Group_Params> dh_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_dh_groups();

      m_shared_group = Group_Params::NONE;

      /*
      RFC 7919 requires that if the client sends any groups in the FFDHE
      range, that we must select one of these. If this is not possible,
      then we are required to reject the connection.

      If the client did not send any DH groups, but did offer DH ciphersuites
      and we selected one, then consult the policy for which DH group to pick.
      */

      if(dh_groups.empty()) {
         m_shared_group = policy.default_dh_group();
      } else {
         m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(dh_groups, {});
      }

      if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Could not agree on a DH group with the client");
      }

      // The policy had better return a group we know about:
      BOTAN_ASSERT(m_shared_group.value().is_dh_named_group(), "DH ciphersuite is using a known finite field group");

      // Note: TLS 1.2 allows defining and using arbitrary DH groups (additional
      //       to the named and standardized ones). This API doesn't allow the
      //       server to make use of that at the moment. TLS 1.3 does not
      //       provide this flexibility!
      //
      // A possible implementation strategy in case one would ever need that:
      // `Policy::default_dh_group()` could return a `std::variant<Group_Params,
      // DL_Group>`, allowing it to define arbitrary groups.
      m_kex_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(m_shared_group.value(), rng);
      auto* dh = dynamic_cast<DH_PrivateKey*>(m_kex_key.get());
      if(dh == nullptr) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a Diffie-Hellman key");
      }

      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("p").serialize(), 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("g").serialize(), 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->public_value(), 2);
   } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      const std::vector<Group_Params> ec_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_ecc_curves();

      if(ec_groups.empty()) {
         throw Internal_Error("Client sent no ECC extension but we negotiated ECDH");
      }

      m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(ec_groups, {});

      if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "No shared ECC group with client");
      }

      m_kex_key = [&] {
         if(m_shared_group->is_ecdh_named_curve()) {
            const auto pubkey_point_format = state.client_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()
                                                ? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
                                                : EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;
            return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(*m_shared_group, rng, pubkey_point_format);
         } else {
            return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(*m_shared_group, rng);
         }
      }();

      if(!m_kex_key) {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");
      }

      const uint16_t named_curve_id = m_shared_group.value().wire_code();
      m_params.push_back(3);  // named curve
      m_params.push_back(get_byte<0>(named_curve_id));
      m_params.push_back(get_byte<1>(named_curve_id));

      // Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
      // point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
      // in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
      append_tls_length_value(m_params, m_kex_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);
   } else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));
   }

   if(state.ciphersuite().signature_used()) {
      BOTAN_ASSERT(signing_key, "Signing key was set");

      std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format = state.choose_sig_format(*signing_key, m_scheme, false, policy);

      std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();

      buf += state.server_hello()->random();
      buf += params();

      m_signature = state.callbacks().tls_sign_message(*signing_key, rng, format.first, format.second, buf);
   }

   state.hash().update(io.send(*this));
}

/**
* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
*/
Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& buf,
                                         const Kex_Algo kex_algo,
                                         const Auth_Method auth_method,
                                         Protocol_Version version) {
   BOTAN_UNUSED(version);  // remove this
   TLS_Data_Reader reader("ServerKeyExchange", buf);

   /*
   * Here we are deserializing enough to find out what offset the
   * signature is at. All processing is done when the Client Key Exchange
   * is prepared.
   */

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);  // identity hint
   }

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
      // 3 bigints, DH p, g, Y

      for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i) {
         reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);
      }
   } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
      reader.get_byte();                     // curve type
      reader.get_uint16_t();                 // curve id
      reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);  // public key
   } else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unsupported kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));
   }

   m_params.assign(buf.data(), buf.data() + reader.read_so_far());

   if(auth_method != Auth_Method::IMPLICIT) {
      m_scheme = Signature_Scheme(reader.get_uint16_t());
      m_signature = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);
   }

   reader.assert_done();
}

/**
* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
*/
std::vector<uint8_t> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const {
   std::vector<uint8_t> buf = params();

   if(!m_signature.empty()) {
      if(m_scheme.is_set()) {
         buf.push_back(get_byte<0>(m_scheme.wire_code()));
         buf.push_back(get_byte<1>(m_scheme.wire_code()));
      }

      append_tls_length_value(buf, m_signature, 2);
   }

   return buf;
}

/**
* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
*/
bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const Public_Key& server_key,
                                 const Handshake_State& state,
                                 const Policy& policy) const {
   policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(server_key);

   std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
      state.parse_sig_format(server_key, m_scheme, state.client_hello()->signature_schemes(), false, policy);

   std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();

   buf += state.server_hello()->random();
   buf += params();

   const bool signature_valid =
      state.callbacks().tls_verify_message(server_key, format.first, format.second, buf, m_signature);

#if defined(BOTAN_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
   BOTAN_UNUSED(signature_valid);
   return true;
#else
   return signature_valid;
#endif
}

const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& Server_Key_Exchange::server_kex_key() const {
   BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(m_kex_key);
   return *m_kex_key;
}

}  // namespace Botan::TLS

1	/*
2	* Server Key Exchange Message
3	* (C) 2004-2010,2012,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd
4	* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
5	*
6	* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
7	*/
8
9	#include <botan/tls_messages.h>
10
11	#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
12	#include <botan/pubkey.h>
13	#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
14	#include <botan/internal/loadstor.h>
15	#include <botan/internal/target_info.h>
16	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
17	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
18	#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
19
20	#include <botan/dh.h>
21
22	namespace Botan::TLS {
23
24	/**
25	* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
26	*/
27	Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,	653✔
28	Handshake_State& state,
29	const Policy& policy,
30	Credentials_Manager& creds,
31	RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
32	const Private_Key* signing_key) {	653✔
33	const std::string hostname = state.client_hello()->sni_hostname();	653✔
34	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	653✔
35
36	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	653✔
37	std::string identity_hint = creds.psk_identity_hint("tls-server", hostname);	47✔
38
39	append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);	94✔
40	}	47✔
41
42	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	653✔
43	const std::vector<Group_Params> dh_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_dh_groups();	5✔
44
45	m_shared_group = Group_Params::NONE;	5✔
46
47	/*
48	RFC 7919 requires that if the client sends any groups in the FFDHE
49	range, that we must select one of these. If this is not possible,
50	then we are required to reject the connection.
51
52	If the client did not send any DH groups, but did offer DH ciphersuites
53	and we selected one, then consult the policy for which DH group to pick.
54	*/
55
56	if(dh_groups.empty()) {	5✔
57	m_shared_group = policy.default_dh_group();	×
58	} else {
59	m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(dh_groups, {});	10✔
60	}
61
62	if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {	5✔
63	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Could not agree on a DH group with the client");	×
64	}
65
66	// The policy had better return a group we know about:
67	BOTAN_ASSERT(m_shared_group.value().is_dh_named_group(), "DH ciphersuite is using a known finite field group");	5✔
68
69	// Note: TLS 1.2 allows defining and using arbitrary DH groups (additional
70	// to the named and standardized ones). This API doesn't allow the
71	// server to make use of that at the moment. TLS 1.3 does not
72	// provide this flexibility!
73	//
74	// A possible implementation strategy in case one would ever need that:
75	// `Policy::default_dh_group()` could return a `std::variant<Group_Params,
76	// DL_Group>`, allowing it to define arbitrary groups.
77	m_kex_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(m_shared_group.value(), rng);	5✔
78	auto* dh = dynamic_cast<DH_PrivateKey*>(m_kex_key.get());	5✔
79	if(dh == nullptr) {	5✔
80	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a Diffie-Hellman key");	×
81	}
82
83	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("p").serialize(), 2);	15✔
84	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->get_int_field("g").serialize(), 2);	15✔
85	append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->public_value(), 2);	15✔
86	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	653✔
87	const std::vector<Group_Params> ec_groups = state.client_hello()->supported_ecc_curves();	611✔
88
89	if(ec_groups.empty()) {	611✔
90	throw Internal_Error("Client sent no ECC extension but we negotiated ECDH");	×
91	}
92
93	m_shared_group = policy.choose_key_exchange_group(ec_groups, {});	1,222✔
94
95	if(m_shared_group.value() == Group_Params::NONE) {	611✔
96	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "No shared ECC group with client");	×
97	}
98
99	m_kex_key = [&] {	1,833✔
100	if(m_shared_group->is_ecdh_named_curve()) {	611✔
101	const auto pubkey_point_format = state.client_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()	28✔
102	? EC_Point_Format::Compressed	28✔
103	: EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;	28✔
104	return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(*m_shared_group, rng, pubkey_point_format);	28✔
105	} else {
106	return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(*m_shared_group, rng);	1,166✔
107	}
108	}();	611✔
109
110	if(!m_kex_key) {	611✔
111	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");	×
112	}
113
114	const uint16_t named_curve_id = m_shared_group.value().wire_code();	611✔
115	m_params.push_back(3); // named curve	611✔
116	m_params.push_back(get_byte<0>(named_curve_id));	611✔
117	m_params.push_back(get_byte<1>(named_curve_id));	611✔
118
119	// Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
120	// point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
121	// in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
122	append_tls_length_value(m_params, m_kex_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);	1,833✔
123	} else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {	648✔
124	throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));	×
125	}
126
127	if(state.ciphersuite().signature_used()) {	653✔
128	BOTAN_ASSERT(signing_key, "Signing key was set");	606✔
129
130	std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format = state.choose_sig_format(*signing_key, m_scheme, false, policy);	606✔
131
132	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();	606✔
133
134	buf += state.server_hello()->random();	606✔
135	buf += params();	606✔
136
137	m_signature = state.callbacks().tls_sign_message(*signing_key, rng, format.first, format.second, buf);	606✔
138	}	606✔
139
140	state.hash().update(io.send(*this));	1,957✔
141	}	655✔
142
143	/**
144	* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
145	*/
146	Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& buf,	1,000✔
147	const Kex_Algo kex_algo,
148	const Auth_Method auth_method,
149	Protocol_Version version) {	1,000✔
150	BOTAN_UNUSED(version); // remove this	1,000✔
151	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ServerKeyExchange", buf);	1,000✔
152
153	/*
154	* Here we are deserializing enough to find out what offset the
155	* signature is at. All processing is done when the Client Key Exchange
156	* is prepared.
157	*/
158
159	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	1,000✔
160	reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535); // identity hint	108✔
161	}
162
163	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	1,000✔
164	// 3 bigints, DH p, g, Y
165
166	for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i) {	91✔
167	reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	137✔
168	}
169	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	974✔
170	reader.get_byte(); // curve type	944✔
171	reader.get_uint16_t(); // curve id	943✔
172	reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255); // public key	1,883✔
173	} else if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::PSK) {	30✔
174	throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unsupported kex type " + kex_method_to_string(kex_algo));	×
175	}
176
177	m_params.assign(buf.data(), buf.data() + reader.read_so_far());	990✔
178
179	if(auth_method != Auth_Method::IMPLICIT) {	990✔
180	m_scheme = Signature_Scheme(reader.get_uint16_t());	936✔
181	m_signature = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);	933✔
182	}
183
184	reader.assert_done();	982✔
185	}	1,016✔
186
187	/**
188	* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
189	*/
190	std::vector<uint8_t> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const {	653✔
191	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = params();	653✔
192
193	if(!m_signature.empty()) {	653✔
194	if(m_scheme.is_set()) {	606✔
195	buf.push_back(get_byte<0>(m_scheme.wire_code()));	606✔
196	buf.push_back(get_byte<1>(m_scheme.wire_code()));	606✔
197	}
198
199	append_tls_length_value(buf, m_signature, 2);	606✔
200	}
201
202	return buf;	653✔
203	}	×
204
205	/**
206	* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
207	*/
208	bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const Public_Key& server_key,	924✔
209	const Handshake_State& state,
210	const Policy& policy) const {
211	policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(server_key);	924✔
212
213	std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =	875✔
214	state.parse_sig_format(server_key, m_scheme, state.client_hello()->signature_schemes(), false, policy);	875✔
215
216	std::vector<uint8_t> buf = state.client_hello()->random();	866✔
217
218	buf += state.server_hello()->random();	866✔
219	buf += params();	866✔
220
221	const bool signature_valid =	866✔
222	state.callbacks().tls_verify_message(server_key, format.first, format.second, buf, m_signature);	866✔
223
224	#if defined(BOTAN_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
225	BOTAN_UNUSED(signature_valid);
226	return true;
227	#else
228	return signature_valid;	866✔
229	#endif
230	}	866✔
231
232	const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& Server_Key_Exchange::server_kex_key() const {	601✔
233	BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(m_kex_key);	601✔
234	return *m_kex_key;	601✔
235	}
236
237	} // namespace Botan::TLS

randombit / botan / 19012754211

Source File Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous