19012754211

Committed 02 Nov 2025 01:10PM UTC coverage: 90.677% (+0.006%) from 90.671%

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Merge pull request #5137 from randombit/jack/clang-tidy-includes

Remove various unused includes flagged by clang-tidy misc-include-cleaner

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/src/lib/tls/tls12/msg_client_kex.cpp

/*
* Client Key Exchange Message
* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
*     2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/

#include <botan/tls_messages.h>

#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
#include <botan/rng.h>
#include <botan/rsa.h>
#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>

namespace Botan::TLS {

/*
* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,
                                         Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Public_Key* server_public_key,
                                         std::string_view hostname,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      std::string identity_hint;

      if(state.server_kex() != nullptr) {
         TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());
         identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
      }

      m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

      append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

      SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());

      std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());

      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
   } else if(state.server_kex() != nullptr) {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
         const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);

         if(reader.remaining_bytes() > 0) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");
         }

         DL_Group group(modulus, generator);

         if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");
         }

         const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);
         m_pre_master = CT::strip_leading_zeros(
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));
         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();
         if(curve_type != 3) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");
         }

         const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,
                                "Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");
         }

         if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");
         }

         const auto private_key = [&] {
            if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {
               const auto pubkey_point_format = state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()
                                                   ? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
                                                   : EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;
               return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(curve_id, rng, pubkey_point_format);
            } else {
               return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);
            }
         }();

         if(!private_key) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");
         }

         auto shared_secret =
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);

         if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {
            m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
         }

         // Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
         // point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
         // in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");
      }

      reader.assert_done();
   } else {
      // No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert

      if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
         throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");
      }

      if(server_public_key == nullptr) {
         throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");
      }

      if(const auto* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {
         const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();

         rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);
         m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();
         m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();

         PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");

         const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);
      } else {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,
                             "Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());
      }
   }

   state.hash().update(io.send(*this));
}

/*
* Read a Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,
                                         const Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
      BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),
                   "RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");

      if(server_rsa_kex_key == nullptr) {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");
      }

      if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());
      }

      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);
      const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);
      reader.assert_done();

      PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");

      const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();
      const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();

      /*
      * PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
      * either the length does not match the expected value or if the
      * version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
      * in the client hello.
      */
      const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;
      const size_t expected_content_size = 2;
      const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};
      const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};

      m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),
                                                 encrypted_pre_master.size(),
                                                 expected_plaintext_size,
                                                 rng,
                                                 expected_content_bytes,
                                                 expected_content_pos,
                                                 expected_content_size);
   } else {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {
         m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());

         if(psk.empty()) {
            if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {
               psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);
            } else {
               throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());
            }
         }
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
         std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();

         const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")
                                                       ? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)
                                                       : reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();
         BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);

         try {
            auto shared_secret =
               state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);

            if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {
               shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);
            }

            if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
            } else {
               m_pre_master = shared_secret;
            }
         } catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());
         } catch(TLS_Exception& e) {
            // NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
            throw e;
         } catch(std::exception&) {
            /*
            * Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
            * attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
            * failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
            * allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
            */
            rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());
         }

         reader.assert_done();
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");
      }
   }
}

}  // namespace Botan::TLS

1	/*
2	* Client Key Exchange Message
3	* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
4	* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
5	*
6	* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
7	*/
8
9	#include <botan/tls_messages.h>
10
11	#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
12	#include <botan/rng.h>
13	#include <botan/rsa.h>
14	#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
15	#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
16	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
17	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
18	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
19	#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
20
21	namespace Botan::TLS {
22
23	/*
24	* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
25	*/
26	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,	827✔
27	Handshake_State& state,
28	const Policy& policy,
29	Credentials_Manager& creds,
30	const Public_Key* server_public_key,
31	std::string_view hostname,
32	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	827✔
33	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	827✔
34
35	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	827✔
36	std::string identity_hint;	47✔
37
38	if(state.server_kex() != nullptr) {	47✔
39	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	30✔
40	identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	30✔
41	}
42
43	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	94✔
44
45	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	47✔
46
47	SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	141✔
48
49	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	47✔
50
51	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	47✔
52	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	141✔
53	} else if(state.server_kex() != nullptr) {	874✔
54	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	700✔
55
56	SymmetricKey psk;	700✔
57
58	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	700✔
59	std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	22✔
60
61	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	44✔
62
63	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	22✔
64
65	psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	66✔
66	}	22✔
67
68	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	700✔
69	const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	21✔
70	const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	5✔
71	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	5✔
72
73	if(reader.remaining_bytes() > 0) {	5✔
74	throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");	×
75	}
76
77	DL_Group group(modulus, generator);	5✔
78
79	if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {	5✔
80	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");	×
81	}
82
83	const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);	5✔
84	m_pre_master = CT::strip_leading_zeros(	15✔
85	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));	15✔
86	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);	15✔
87	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	710✔
88	const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();	695✔
89	if(curve_type != 3) {	695✔
90	throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");	×
91	}
92
93	const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());	695✔
94	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	695✔
95
96	if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {	695✔
97	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,	3✔
98	"Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");	3✔
99	}
100
101	if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {	1,384✔
102	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");	1✔
103	}
104
105	const auto private_key = [&] {	16✔
106	if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {	691✔
107	const auto pubkey_point_format = state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()	25✔
108	? EC_Point_Format::Compressed	25✔
109	: EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed;	25✔
110	return state.callbacks().tls12_generate_ephemeral_ecdh_key(curve_id, rng, pubkey_point_format);	25✔
111	} else {
112	return state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);	1,332✔
113	}
114	}();	691✔
115
116	if(!private_key) {	691✔
117	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide an EC key");	×
118	}
119
120	auto shared_secret =	691✔
121	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);	703✔
122
123	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {	679✔
124	m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);	657✔
125	} else {
126	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	22✔
127	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	66✔
128	}
129
130	// Note: In contrast to public_value(), raw_public_key_bits() takes the
131	// point format (compressed vs. uncompressed) into account that was set
132	// in its construction within tls_generate_ephemeral_key().
133	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->raw_public_key_bits(), 1);	2,037✔
134	} else {	2,065✔
135	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");	×
136	}
137
138	reader.assert_done();	684✔
139	} else {	700✔
140	// No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert
141
142	if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	80✔
143	throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");	×
144	}
145
146	if(server_public_key == nullptr) {	80✔
147	throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");	×
148	}
149
150	if(const auto* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {	80✔
151	const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();	80✔
152
153	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);	80✔
154	m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();	80✔
155	m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();	80✔
156
157	PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");	80✔
158
159	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);	80✔
160
161	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);	160✔
162	} else {	80✔
163	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,	×
164	"Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());	×
165	}
166	}
167
168	state.hash().update(io.send(*this));	1,622✔
169	}	827✔
170
171	/*
172	* Read a Client Key Exchange message
173	*/
174	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,	696✔
175	const Handshake_State& state,
176	const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
177	Credentials_Manager& creds,
178	const Policy& policy,
179	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	696✔
180	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	696✔
181
182	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	696✔
183	BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),	58✔
184	"RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");
185
186	if(server_rsa_kex_key == nullptr) {	58✔
187	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");	×
188	}
189
190	if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {	58✔
191	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());	×
192	}
193
194	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	58✔
195	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);	58✔
196	reader.assert_done();	58✔
197
198	PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");	58✔
199
200	const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();	58✔
201	const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();	58✔
202
203	/*
204	* PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
205	* either the length does not match the expected value or if the
206	* version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
207	* in the client hello.
208	*/
209	const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;	58✔
210	const size_t expected_content_size = 2;	58✔
211	const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};	58✔
212	const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};	58✔
213
214	m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),	58✔
215	encrypted_pre_master.size(),
216	expected_plaintext_size,
217	rng,
218	expected_content_bytes,
219	expected_content_pos,
220	expected_content_size);	58✔
221	} else {	116✔
222	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	638✔
223
224	SymmetricKey psk;	638✔
225
226	if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {	638✔
227	m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	47✔
228
229	psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());	94✔
230
231	if(psk.empty()) {	47✔
232	if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {	×
233	psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);	×
234	} else {
235	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());	×
236	}
237	}
238	}
239
240	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	47✔
241	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	37✔
242	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	37✔
243	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	111✔
244	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	638✔
245	const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();	601✔
246
247	const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")	615✔
248	? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)	601✔
249	: reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	601✔
250
251	const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();	601✔
252	BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);	601✔
253
254	try {	601✔
255	auto shared_secret =	601✔
256	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);	613✔
257
258	if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {	589✔
259	shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);	10✔
260	}
261
262	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	589✔
263	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	10✔
264	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	30✔
265	} else {
266	m_pre_master = shared_secret;	579✔
267	}
268	} catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {	601✔
269	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());	×
270	} catch(TLS_Exception& e) {	12✔
271	// NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
272	throw e;	12✔
273	} catch(std::exception&) {	12✔
274	/*
275	* Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
276	* attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
277	* failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
278	* allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
279	*/
280	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());	×
281	}	×
282
283	reader.assert_done();	589✔
284	} else {	601✔
285	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");	×
286	}
287	}	638✔
288	}	698✔
289
290	} // namespace Botan::TLS

randombit / botan / 19012754211

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