16406612795

Committed 21 Jul 2025 01:35AM UTC coverage: 90.64% (-0.003%) from 90.643%

Build # 16406612795

Build Type

push

github

Committed by

web-flow

Commit Message

Merge pull request #5007 from randombit/jack/reduce-tls-header-includes

Remove some unnecessary includes in TLS

Run Details

99948 of 110269 relevant lines covered (90.64%)

12421094.3 hits per line

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

87.59

/src/lib/tls/tls12/msg_client_kex.cpp

/*
* Client Key Exchange Message
* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
*     2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/

#include <botan/tls_messages.h>

#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
#include <botan/ecdh.h>
#include <botan/rng.h>
#include <botan/rsa.h>
#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>

namespace Botan::TLS {

/*
* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,
                                         Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Public_Key* server_public_key,
                                         std::string_view hostname,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      std::string identity_hint;

      if(state.server_kex()) {
         TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());
         identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
      }

      m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

      append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

      SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());

      std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());

      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
   } else if(state.server_kex()) {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
         const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);

         if(reader.remaining_bytes()) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");
         }

         DL_Group group(modulus, generator);

         if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");
         }

         const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);
         m_pre_master = CT::strip_leading_zeros(
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));
         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();
         if(curve_type != 3) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");
         }

         const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,
                                "Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");
         }

         if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");
         }

         const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);
         auto shared_secret =
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);

         if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {
            m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
         }

         if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {
            auto* ecdh_key = dynamic_cast<ECDH_PublicKey*>(private_key.get());
            if(!ecdh_key) {
               throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a ECDH_PublicKey");
            }
            append_tls_length_value(m_key_material,
                                    ecdh_key->public_value(state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()
                                                              ? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
                                                              : EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed),
                                    1);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 1);
         }
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");
      }

      reader.assert_done();
   } else {
      // No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert

      if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
         throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");
      }

      if(!server_public_key) {
         throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");
      }

      if(const auto* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {
         const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();

         rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);
         m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();
         m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();

         PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");

         const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);
      } else {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,
                             "Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());
      }
   }

   state.hash().update(io.send(*this));
}

/*
* Read a Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,
                                         const Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
      BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),
                   "RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");

      if(!server_rsa_kex_key) {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");
      }

      if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());
      }

      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);
      const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);
      reader.assert_done();

      PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");

      const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();
      const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();

      /*
      * PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
      * either the length does not match the expected value or if the
      * version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
      * in the client hello.
      */
      const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;
      const size_t expected_content_size = 2;
      const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};
      const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};

      m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),
                                                 encrypted_pre_master.size(),
                                                 expected_plaintext_size,
                                                 rng,
                                                 expected_content_bytes,
                                                 expected_content_pos,
                                                 expected_content_size);
   } else {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {
         m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());

         if(psk.empty()) {
            if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {
               psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);
            } else {
               throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());
            }
         }
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
         std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();

         const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")
                                                       ? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)
                                                       : reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();
         BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);

         try {
            auto shared_secret =
               state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);

            if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {
               shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);
            }

            if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
            } else {
               m_pre_master = shared_secret;
            }
         } catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());
         } catch(TLS_Exception& e) {
            // NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
            throw e;
         } catch(std::exception&) {
            /*
            * Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
            * attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
            * failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
            * allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
            */
            rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());
         }

         reader.assert_done();
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");
      }
   }
}

}  // namespace Botan::TLS

1	/*
2	* Client Key Exchange Message
3	* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
4	* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
5	*
6	* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
7	*/
8
9	#include <botan/tls_messages.h>
10
11	#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
12	#include <botan/ecdh.h>
13	#include <botan/rng.h>
14	#include <botan/rsa.h>
15	#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
16	#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
17	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
18	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
19	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
20	#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
21
22	namespace Botan::TLS {
23
24	/*
25	* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
26	*/
27	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,	830✔
28	Handshake_State& state,
29	const Policy& policy,
30	Credentials_Manager& creds,
31	const Public_Key* server_public_key,
32	std::string_view hostname,
33	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	830✔
34	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	830✔
35
36	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	830✔
37	std::string identity_hint;	47✔
38
39	if(state.server_kex()) {	47✔
40	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	30✔
41	identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	30✔
42	}
43
44	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	94✔
45
46	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	47✔
47
48	SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	141✔
49
50	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	47✔
51
52	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	47✔
53	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	141✔
54	} else if(state.server_kex()) {	877✔
55	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	703✔
56
57	SymmetricKey psk;	703✔
58
59	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	703✔
60	std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	24✔
61
62	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	48✔
63
64	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, as_span_of_bytes(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	24✔
65
66	psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	72✔
67	}	24✔
68
69	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	703✔
70	const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	22✔
71	const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	6✔
72	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	6✔
73
74	if(reader.remaining_bytes()) {	6✔
75	throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");	×
76	}
77
78	DL_Group group(modulus, generator);	6✔
79
80	if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {	6✔
81	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");	×
82	}
83
84	const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);	6✔
85	m_pre_master = CT::strip_leading_zeros(	18✔
86	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));	18✔
87	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);	18✔
88	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	715✔
89	const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();	697✔
90	if(curve_type != 3) {	697✔
91	throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");	×
92	}
93
94	const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());	697✔
95	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	697✔
96
97	if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {	697✔
98	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,	3✔
99	"Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");	3✔
100	}
101
102	if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {	1,388✔
103	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");	1✔
104	}
105
106	const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);	709✔
107	auto shared_secret =	693✔
108	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);	705✔
109
110	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {	681✔
111	m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);	657✔
112	} else {
113	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	24✔
114	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	72✔
115	}
116
117	if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {	681✔
118	auto* ecdh_key = dynamic_cast<ECDH_PublicKey*>(private_key.get());	13✔
119	if(!ecdh_key) {	13✔
120	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a ECDH_PublicKey");	×
121	}
122	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material,	26✔
123	ecdh_key->public_value(state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()	39✔
124	? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
125	: EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed),
126	1);
127	} else {
128	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 1);	2,004✔
129	}
130	} else {	2,071✔
131	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");	×
132	}
133
134	reader.assert_done();	687✔
135	} else {	703✔
136	// No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert
137
138	if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	80✔
139	throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");	×
140	}
141
142	if(!server_public_key) {	80✔
143	throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");	×
144	}
145
146	if(const auto* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {	80✔
147	const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();	80✔
148
149	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);	80✔
150	m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();	80✔
151	m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();	80✔
152
153	PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");	80✔
154
155	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);	80✔
156
157	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);	160✔
158	} else {	80✔
159	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,	×
160	"Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());	×
161	}
162	}
163
164	state.hash().update(io.send(*this));	1,628✔
165	}	830✔
166
167	/*
168	* Read a Client Key Exchange message
169	*/
170	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,	699✔
171	const Handshake_State& state,
172	const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
173	Credentials_Manager& creds,
174	const Policy& policy,
175	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	699✔
176	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	699✔
177
178	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	699✔
179	BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),	58✔
180	"RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");
181
182	if(!server_rsa_kex_key) {	58✔
183	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");	×
184	}
185
186	if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {	58✔
187	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());	×
188	}
189
190	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	58✔
191	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);	58✔
192	reader.assert_done();	58✔
193
194	PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");	58✔
195
196	const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();	58✔
197	const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();	58✔
198
199	/*
200	* PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
201	* either the length does not match the expected value or if the
202	* version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
203	* in the client hello.
204	*/
205	const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;	58✔
206	const size_t expected_content_size = 2;	58✔
207	const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};	58✔
208	const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};	58✔
209
210	m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),	58✔
211	encrypted_pre_master.size(),
212	expected_plaintext_size,
213	rng,
214	expected_content_bytes,
215	expected_content_pos,
216	expected_content_size);	58✔
217	} else {	116✔
218	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	641✔
219
220	SymmetricKey psk;	641✔
221
222	if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {	641✔
223	m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	49✔
224
225	psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());	98✔
226
227	if(psk.empty()) {	49✔
228	if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {	×
229	psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);	×
230	} else {
231	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());	×
232	}
233	}
234	}
235
236	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	49✔
237	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	37✔
238	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	37✔
239	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	111✔
240	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	641✔
241	const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();	604✔
242
243	const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")	618✔
244	? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)	604✔
245	: reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	604✔
246
247	const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();	604✔
248	BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);	604✔
249
250	try {	604✔
251	auto shared_secret =	604✔
252	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);	616✔
253
254	if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {	592✔
255	shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);	12✔
256	}
257
258	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	592✔
259	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	12✔
260	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	36✔
261	} else {
262	m_pre_master = shared_secret;	580✔
263	}
264	} catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {	604✔
265	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());	×
266	} catch(TLS_Exception& e) {	12✔
267	// NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
268	throw e;	12✔
269	} catch(std::exception&) {	12✔
270	/*
271	* Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
272	* attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
273	* failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
274	* allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
275	*/
276	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());	×
277	}	×
278
279	reader.assert_done();	592✔
280	} else {	604✔
281	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");	×
282	}
283	}	641✔
284	}	701✔
285
286	} // namespace Botan::TLS

randombit / botan / 16406612795

Source File Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous

Source File
Press 'n' to go to next uncovered line, 'b' for previous