11385316852

Committed 17 Oct 2024 12:51PM UTC coverage: 91.14% (+0.02%) from 91.125%

Build # 11385316852

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Merge pull request #4389 from Rohde-Schwarz/tls/bogo_update

TLS: BoGo tests update

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/src/lib/tls/tls12/msg_client_kex.cpp

/*
* Client Key Exchange Message
* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
*     2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/

#include <botan/tls_messages.h>

#include <botan/rng.h>
#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>

#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>

#include <botan/ecdh.h>
#include <botan/rsa.h>

namespace Botan::TLS {

/*
* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,
                                         Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Public_Key* server_public_key,
                                         std::string_view hostname,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
      std::string identity_hint;

      if(state.server_kex()) {
         TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());
         identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
      }

      m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

      append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, to_byte_vector(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

      SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());

      std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());

      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
      append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
   } else if(state.server_kex()) {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, to_byte_vector(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
         const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);

         if(reader.remaining_bytes()) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");
         }

         DL_Group group(modulus, generator);

         if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");
         }

         const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);
         auto shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));

         if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {
            m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
         }

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();
         if(curve_type != 3) {
            throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");
         }

         const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());
         const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,
                                "Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");
         }

         if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");
         }

         const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);
         auto shared_secret =
            state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);

         if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {
            m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
            append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
         }

         if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {
            auto ecdh_key = dynamic_cast<ECDH_PublicKey*>(private_key.get());
            if(!ecdh_key) {
               throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a ECDH_PublicKey");
            }
            append_tls_length_value(m_key_material,
                                    ecdh_key->public_value(state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()
                                                              ? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
                                                              : EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed),
                                    1);
         } else {
            append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 1);
         }
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");
      }

      reader.assert_done();
   } else {
      // No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert

      if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
         throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");
      }

      if(!server_public_key) {
         throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");
      }

      if(auto rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {
         const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();

         rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);
         m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();
         m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();

         PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");

         const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);

         append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);
      } else {
         throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,
                             "Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());
      }
   }

   state.hash().update(io.send(*this));
}

/*
* Read a Client Key Exchange message
*/
Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,
                                         const Handshake_State& state,
                                         const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
                                         Credentials_Manager& creds,
                                         const Policy& policy,
                                         RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {
   const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();

   if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {
      BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),
                   "RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");

      if(!server_rsa_kex_key) {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");
      }

      if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {
         throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());
      }

      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);
      const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);
      reader.assert_done();

      PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");

      const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();
      const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();

      /*
      * PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
      * either the length does not match the expected value or if the
      * version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
      * in the client hello.
      */
      const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;
      const size_t expected_content_size = 2;
      const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};
      const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};

      m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),
                                                 encrypted_pre_master.size(),
                                                 expected_plaintext_size,
                                                 rng,
                                                 expected_content_bytes,
                                                 expected_content_pos,
                                                 expected_content_size);
   } else {
      TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);

      SymmetricKey psk;

      if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {
         m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);

         psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());

         if(psk.empty()) {
            if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {
               psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);
            } else {
               throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());
            }
         }
      }

      if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {
         std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);
         append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
      } else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH || kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
         const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();

         const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")
                                                       ? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)
                                                       : reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);

         const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();
         BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);

         try {
            auto shared_secret =
               state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);

            if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {
               shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);
            }

            if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
               append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
            } else {
               m_pre_master = shared_secret;
            }
         } catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {
            throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());
         } catch(TLS_Exception& e) {
            // NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
            throw e;
         } catch(std::exception&) {
            /*
            * Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
            * attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
            * failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
            * allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
            */
            rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());
         }

         reader.assert_done();
      } else {
         throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");
      }
   }
}

}  // namespace Botan::TLS

1	/*
2	* Client Key Exchange Message
3	* (C) 2004-2010,2016 Jack Lloyd
4	* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
5	*
6	* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
7	*/
8
9	#include <botan/tls_messages.h>
10
11	#include <botan/rng.h>
12	#include <botan/tls_extensions.h>
13
14	#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
15	#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
16	#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
17	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
18	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_io.h>
19	#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
20	#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
21
22	#include <botan/ecdh.h>
23	#include <botan/rsa.h>
24
25	namespace Botan::TLS {
26
27	/*
28	* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
29	*/
30	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Handshake_IO& io,	793✔
31	Handshake_State& state,
32	const Policy& policy,
33	Credentials_Manager& creds,
34	const Public_Key* server_public_key,
35	std::string_view hostname,
36	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	793✔
37	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	793✔
38
39	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	793✔
40	std::string identity_hint;	41✔
41
42	if(state.server_kex()) {	41✔
43	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	25✔
44	identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	25✔
45	}
46
47	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	82✔
48
49	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, to_byte_vector(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	82✔
50
51	SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	123✔
52
53	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	41✔
54
55	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	41✔
56	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	123✔
57	} else if(state.server_kex()) {	834✔
58	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", state.server_kex()->params());	698✔
59
60	SymmetricKey psk;	698✔
61
62	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	698✔
63	std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	24✔
64
65	m_psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client", std::string(hostname), identity_hint);	48✔
66
67	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, to_byte_vector(m_psk_identity.value()), 2);	48✔
68
69	psk = creds.psk("tls-client", std::string(hostname), m_psk_identity.value());	72✔
70	}	24✔
71
72	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	698✔
73	const auto modulus = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	20✔
74	const auto generator = BigInt::from_bytes(reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535));	5✔
75	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 1, 65535);	5✔
76
77	if(reader.remaining_bytes()) {	5✔
78	throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");	×
79	}
80
81	DL_Group group(modulus, generator);	5✔
82
83	if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) {	5✔
84	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InsufficientSecurity, "DH group validation failed");	×
85	}
86
87	const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(group, rng);	5✔
88	auto shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(	5✔
89	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(group, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy));	10✔
90
91	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH) {	5✔
92	m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);	5✔
93	} else {
94	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
95	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
96	}
97
98	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 2);	15✔
99	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	723✔
100	const uint8_t curve_type = reader.get_byte();	693✔
101	if(curve_type != 3) {	693✔
102	throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");	×
103	}
104
105	const Group_Params curve_id = static_cast<Group_Params>(reader.get_uint16_t());	693✔
106	const std::vector<uint8_t> peer_public_value = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	693✔
107
108	if(!curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve() && !curve_id.is_x25519() && !curve_id.is_x448()) {	693✔
109	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter,	2✔
110	"Server selected a group that is not compatible with the negotiated ciphersuite");	2✔
111	}
112
113	if(policy.choose_key_exchange_group({curve_id}, {}) != curve_id) {	1,382✔
114	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure, "Server sent ECC curve prohibited by policy");	1✔
115	}
116
117	const auto private_key = state.callbacks().tls_generate_ephemeral_key(curve_id, rng);	705✔
118	auto shared_secret =	690✔
119	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(curve_id, *private_key, peer_public_value, rng, policy);	702✔
120
121	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH) {	678✔
122	m_pre_master = std::move(shared_secret);	654✔
123	} else {
124	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	24✔
125	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	72✔
126	}
127
128	if(curve_id.is_ecdh_named_curve()) {	678✔
129	auto ecdh_key = dynamic_cast<ECDH_PublicKey*>(private_key.get());	13✔
130	if(!ecdh_key) {	13✔
131	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::InternalError, "Application did not provide a ECDH_PublicKey");	×
132	}
133	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material,	26✔
134	ecdh_key->public_value(state.server_hello()->prefers_compressed_ec_points()	39✔
135	? EC_Point_Format::Compressed
136	: EC_Point_Format::Uncompressed),
137	1);
138	} else {
139	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, private_key->public_value(), 1);	1,995✔
140	}
141	} else {	2,061✔
142	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange method was negotiated");	×
143	}
144
145	reader.assert_done();	683✔
146	} else {	698✔
147	// No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert
148
149	if(kex_algo != Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	54✔
150	throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex message, but negotiated a key exchange that required it");	×
151	}
152
153	if(!server_public_key) {	54✔
154	throw Internal_Error("No server public key for RSA exchange");	×
155	}
156
157	if(auto rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(server_public_key)) {	54✔
158	const Protocol_Version offered_version = state.client_hello()->legacy_version();	54✔
159
160	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, 48);	54✔
161	m_pre_master[0] = offered_version.major_version();	54✔
162	m_pre_master[1] = offered_version.minor_version();	54✔
163
164	PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, rng, "PKCS1v15");	54✔
165
166	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(m_pre_master, rng);	54✔
167
168	append_tls_length_value(m_key_material, encrypted_key, 2);	108✔
169	} else {	54✔
170	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HandshakeFailure,	×
171	"Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " + server_public_key->algo_name());	×
172	}
173	}
174
175	state.hash().update(io.send(*this));	1,556✔
176	}	793✔
177
178	/*
179	* Read a Client Key Exchange message
180	*/
181	Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const std::vector<uint8_t>& contents,	690✔
182	const Handshake_State& state,
183	const Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key,
184	Credentials_Manager& creds,
185	const Policy& policy,
186	RandomNumberGenerator& rng) {	690✔
187	const Kex_Algo kex_algo = state.ciphersuite().kex_method();	690✔
188
189	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::STATIC_RSA) {	690✔
190	BOTAN_ASSERT(state.server_certs() && !state.server_certs()->cert_chain().empty(),	58✔
191	"RSA key exchange negotiated so server sent a certificate");
192
193	if(!server_rsa_kex_key) {	58✔
194	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");	×
195	}
196
197	if(server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name() != "RSA") {	58✔
198	throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + server_rsa_kex_key->algo_name());	×
199	}
200
201	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	58✔
202	const std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_pre_master = reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535);	58✔
203	reader.assert_done();	58✔
204
205	PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*server_rsa_kex_key, rng, "PKCS1v15");	58✔
206
207	const uint8_t client_major = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().major_version();	58✔
208	const uint8_t client_minor = state.client_hello()->legacy_version().minor_version();	58✔
209
210	/*
211	* PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random will return a random value if
212	* either the length does not match the expected value or if the
213	* version number embedded in the PMS does not match the one sent
214	* in the client hello.
215	*/
216	const size_t expected_plaintext_size = 48;	58✔
217	const size_t expected_content_size = 2;	58✔
218	const uint8_t expected_content_bytes[expected_content_size] = {client_major, client_minor};	58✔
219	const uint8_t expected_content_pos[expected_content_size] = {0, 1};	58✔
220
221	m_pre_master = decryptor.decrypt_or_random(encrypted_pre_master.data(),	58✔
222	encrypted_pre_master.size(),
223	expected_plaintext_size,
224	rng,
225	expected_content_bytes,
226	expected_content_pos,
227	expected_content_size);	58✔
228	} else {	116✔
229	TLS_Data_Reader reader("ClientKeyExchange", contents);	632✔
230
231	SymmetricKey psk;	632✔
232
233	if(key_exchange_is_psk(kex_algo)) {	632✔
234	m_psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);	44✔
235
236	psk = creds.psk("tls-server", state.client_hello()->sni_hostname(), m_psk_identity.value());	88✔
237
238	if(psk.empty()) {	44✔
239	if(policy.hide_unknown_users()) {	×
240	psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);	×
241	} else {
242	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UnknownPSKIdentity, "No PSK for identifier " + m_psk_identity.value());	×
243	}
244	}
245	}
246
247	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::PSK) {	44✔
248	std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(psk.length());	32✔
249	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, zeros, 2);	32✔
250	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	96✔
251	} else if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::DH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDH \|\| kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	632✔
252	const PK_Key_Agreement_Key& ka_key = state.server_kex()->server_kex_key();	600✔
253
254	const std::vector<uint8_t> client_pubkey = (ka_key.algo_name() == "DH")	614✔
255	? reader.get_range<uint8_t>(2, 0, 65535)	600✔
256	: reader.get_range<uint8_t>(1, 1, 255);	600✔
257
258	const auto shared_group = state.server_kex()->shared_group();	600✔
259	BOTAN_STATE_CHECK(shared_group && shared_group.value() != Group_Params::NONE);	600✔
260
261	try {	600✔
262	auto shared_secret =	600✔
263	state.callbacks().tls_ephemeral_key_agreement(shared_group.value(), ka_key, client_pubkey, rng, policy);	612✔
264
265	if(ka_key.algo_name() == "DH") {	588✔
266	shared_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);	10✔
267	}
268
269	if(kex_algo == Kex_Algo::ECDHE_PSK) {	588✔
270	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, shared_secret, 2);	12✔
271	append_tls_length_value(m_pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);	36✔
272	} else {
273	m_pre_master = shared_secret;	576✔
274	}
275	} catch(Invalid_Argument& e) {	600✔
276	throw TLS_Exception(Alert::IllegalParameter, e.what());	×
277	} catch(TLS_Exception& e) {	12✔
278	// NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err60-cpp)
279	throw e;	12✔
280	} catch(std::exception&) {	12✔
281	/*
282	* Something failed in the DH/ECDH computation. To avoid possible
283	* attacks which are based on triggering and detecting some edge
284	* failure condition, randomize the pre-master output and carry on,
285	* allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished checks.
286	*/
287	rng.random_vec(m_pre_master, ka_key.public_value().size());	×
288	}	×
289
290	reader.assert_done();	588✔
291	} else {	600✔
292	throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown key exchange negotiated");	×
293	}
294	}	632✔
295	}	692✔
296
297	} // namespace Botan::TLS

randombit / botan / 11385316852

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